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VOLUME 46 WINTER, 1993 NUMBER 4
CIVIL PENALTIES AND MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT
UNDER THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE:
SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
DAVID S. RUDSTEIN*
I. Introduction
In United States v. Halper,' decided in 1989, a unanimous Supreme Court held
for the first time that a penalty imposed in a civil proceeding brought by the
government can constitute "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Constitution! Specifically, the Court concluded that an individual who has
been punished in a criminal prosecution for her conduct may not be subjected to any
additional civil sanctions for that same conduct to the extent the sanctions are
punitive, as opposed to remedial, in nature.'
Like many cases setting forth a new legal principle, Halper has given rise to a
number of questions concerning the scope of its holding. This article will examine
four of those questions: first, whether, and how, the principle enunciated in Halper
applies when the sequence of the proceedings is the opposite of that in Halper, that
is, where an individual is prosecuted criminally after she already has been subjected
to a sanction in a civil proceeding based upon the same conduct; second, whether,
and how, Halper applies to a tax imposed upon the unlawful possession of marijuana
and other controlled substances; third, whether, and how, Halper applies when the
sanction imposed in the civil proceeding is not a monetary penalty, as in Halper, and
finally, when the sanction imposed, in the civil proceeding serves the remedial
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. LL.M., 1975,
University of Illinois; J.D., 1971, Northwestern University; B.S., 1968, University of Illinois. Funding
for this article was provided by the Marshall Ewell Research Fund at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
2. Id. at 448. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution in part, provides: "[Nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " U.S. CONS?.
amend. V.
3. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.
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purpose of compensating the government for its loss, how should the amount of that
loss be determined.
II. The Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that no
person "shall..'. be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb ... ." This guarantee against double jeopardy is "one of the oldest ideas
found in western civilization."4 It is "fundamental" to the Anglo-American system
of justice,5 and, consequently, applies to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment
The guarantee against double jeopardy encompasses several related protections.
In an often quoted statement from North Carolina v. Pearce,7 the Supreme Court
explained that "[i]t protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal.[r ] It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction.r] And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense."'"
In addition, in some circumstances, the guarantee protects against re-prosecution
following the premature termination of a trial."
4. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Bleck, J., dissenting). The guarantee against
double jeopardy can be traced from Greek and Roman times to the common law of England and into the
jurisprudence of the United States. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,795-96 (1969); Bartkus, 359 U.S.
at 151-55 (Black, J., dissenting). In Bartkus, Justice Black wrote:
Fear and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for the same conduct
is one of the oldest idcas found in western civilization. Its roots run deep into Greek and
Roman times. Even in the Dark Ages, when so many other principles of justice were lost,
the idea that one trial and one punishment were enough remained alive through the canon
law and the teachings of the early Christian writers. By the thirteenth century it seems to
have been firmly established in England, where it came to be considered as a "universal
maxim of the common law." It is not surprising, therefore, that the principle was brought
to this country by the earliest settlers as part of their heritage of freedom, and that it has
been recognized here s fundamental again and again. Today it is found, in varying forms,
not only in the Federal Constitution, but in the jurisprudence or constitutions of every
State, as well as most foreign nations.
Id. (citations omitted).
5. Benton, 395 U.S. at 794-96.
6. Id. at 794 (overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)). The Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, in part, provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without clue process of law .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
7. 395 U.S. 711,717 (1969) (original footnotes omitted and new footnotes added); see also Halper,
490 U.S. at 440; Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1984); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S.
117, 128 (1980); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410,415 (1980); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977);
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342 (1975).
8. E.g., Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 474 U.S. 140, 145-46 (1986); United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 576 (1977); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962); Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896).
9. E.g., Brown, 432 U.S. at 168-69; In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 187-90 (1889).
10. E.g., Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 (1873).
11. See, e.g., United States v. J.om, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 784
(1963).
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A number of policy considerations underlie the guarantee against double jeopardy.
By barring re-prosecution following an acquittal or a conviction, it preserves the
finality of judgments. 2 Also, there are dangers in allowing the government to
subject an individual to repeated trials for a single offense," and there is an inherent
injustice in punishing a person twice for the same offense. 4 Additionally, the
guarantee helps to protect a defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by
a particular tribunal,"'" that is, his interest in "being able, once and for all, to
conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might
believe to be favorably disposed to his fate."'6
IlL Double Jeopardy and Civil Proceedings
The "jeopardy" with which the Fifth Amendment is concerned is the risk that is
"traditionally associated with 'actions intended to authorize criminal punishment to
vindicate public justice."' 7 This risk is present in all criminal prosecutions,
regardless of whether the offense charged is a felony or a misdemeanor. 8 It also
may be present in certain "civil" proceedings that are "essentially criminal"'9 in
character, such as an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether a juvenile is
delinquent or in need of supervision' As a general matter, though, the risk to
12. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978);
Brown, 431 U.S. at 165; Jorn, 400 U.S. at 479 (plurality opinion).
13. See, e.g., Johnson, 467 U.S. at 498-99; Crist, 437 U.S. at 35; Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S.
497, 503.04 (1978); Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 569; United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600,
606 (1976); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529-30 (1975); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387-88
(1975); Jorn, 400 U.S. at 479 (plurality opinion); Benton, 395 U.S. at 795-96.
As the Supreme Court stated in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957):
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty.
Id. at 187; see also Breed, 421 U.S. at 529-30.
14. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 154 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) at 168-69; see also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 728-29 (1969) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
15. Crist, 437 U.S. at 35-36 (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949)).
16. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 486 (plurality opinion).
17. Breed, 421 U.S. at 529 (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49
(1943)).
18. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 172-73.
19. Breed, 421 U.S. at 528 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398 (1938)).
20. Id. at 531.
21. In re R.L.K., 384 N.E.2d 531,534-35 (II. App. Ct. 1978); A.R. v. State, 678 S.W.2d 177, 179-
80 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). But see Joiner v. State, 500 So. 2d 81, 82-83 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)
(proceeding to determine whether ajuvenile is dependent is not subject to the double jeopardy provision);
Fariss v. State, 798 S.W.2d 103, 104-05 (Ark. 1990) (same); In re Neil C., 521 A.2d 329, 332 (Md.
1987) (proceeding to determine whether a juvenile is in need of assistance does not amount to a criminal
charge for double jeopardy purposes); In re Spause, 553 A.2d 87, 90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that
1993]
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which the Double Jecpardy Clause refers is not present in civil proceedings.2"
Therefore, a legislature "may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect
to the same act or omission"' without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The underlying question in determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
applies to a particular type of proceeding is "whether [the] proceeding is intended to
be, or by its nature nezessarily is, criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial."'
This inquiry, in turn, proceeds upon two levels. First, one must determine "whether
a juvenile is not placed in jeopardy at a proceeding to determine dependency).
22. Breed, 421 U.S. at 528 (explaining that "Mhe risk to which the Clause refers is not present in
prbceedings that are not 'essentially criminal.'"). The Double Jeopardy Clause has been held inapplicable
to various types of proceedings, including extradition proceedings, Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426, 429
(1923); In re Extradition of McMullen, 769 F. Supp. 1278, 1288 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd on another
ground, 953 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1992); McCrary v. Scully, 544 N.Y.S.2d 852, 853 (App. Div. 1989), bond
revocation proceedings, Showery v. Samaniego, 814 F.2d 200, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1987), probation
revocation proceedings, United States v. Miller, 797 F.2d 336, 340-41 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Whitney, 649 F.2d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1981); People v. Johnson, 477 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991); Davenport v. State, 574 S.W.2d 73,75-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), parole revocation proceedings,
United States v. Hanahan, 798 F.2d 187, 189-90 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Whitney, 649 F.2d 296,
298 (5th Cir. 1981); Rivenbark v. Commonwealth, 501 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Pa. 1985), involuntary
commitment proceedings, Wiggins v. State, 319 S.E.2d 528, 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (mental illness);
People v. McDonald, 542 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (II1. App. Ct. 1989) (sexually dangerous person); In re
Vandenberg, 617 P.2d 675, 679 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (mental deficiency), proceedings for violating civil
traffic laws, Taylor v. Sherrill, 819 P.2d 921, 926-28 (Ariz. 1991); Purcell v. United States, 594 A.2d
527, 531 (D.C. 1991); State v. Naydihor, 483 N.W.2d 253, 257 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992), civil contempt
proceedings, United States v. Ryan, 810 F.2d 650, 653 & n.l (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Morales,
566 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1977); Sanders v. Shephard, 541 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Il1. App. Ct. 1989),
deportation proceedings, Oliver v. Department of Justice, 517 F.2d 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1975), prison
disciplinary proceedings, Kerns v. Parratt, 672 F.2d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir. 1982); People v. Lewis, 386
N.E.2d 910,914-15 (111. App. Ct. 1979); People v. Williams, 576 N.Y.S.2d 57, 57-58 (App. Div. 1991).
But see In re Lamb, 296 N.E.2d 280, 289 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973) (holding that prisoners who have been
convicted and punished for th-, offense of escape cannot subsequently be placed in punitive detention by
prison authorities for the same escape), disciplinary proceedings against members of a certain profession,
Fitzsimmons v. State Bar, 667 P.2d 700, 703-04 (Cal. 1983) (attorney); In re Soileau, 502 So. 2d 1083,
1086 (La. 1987) (judge); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Brown, 517 A.2d 1111, 1112 (Md. 1986)
(attorney); Arthurs v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 418 N.E.2d 1236, 1248 (Mass. 1981)
(physician); In re Oxman, 437 A.2d 1169, 1173 (Pa. 1981) (attorney), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982),
disciplinary proceedings against public employees, Heath v. State Tenure Comm'n. 401 So. 2d 68, 72
(Ala. Civ. App. 1981); Price v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 487 N.E.2d 673, 676 (111. App. Ct.
1985); Louisville Civil Serv. Bd. v. Blair, 711 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Ky. 1986), proceedings to revoke or
suspend an individual's driver's license, State v. Nichols, 819 P.2d 995, 997-98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991);
Giudice v. Adduci, 575 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (App. Div. 1991); Price v. Reed, 725 P.2d 1254, 1258-60
(Okla. 1986), and actions by the state to terminate parental rights, Division of Youth & Family Services
v. V.K., 565 A.2d 706, 710 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 934 (1990), or to
secure payment of pregnancy expenses and support payments, Commonwealth v. Dias, 432 N.E.2d 506,
508-09 (Mass. 1982).
23. Helvering, 303 U.S. tt 399; see also United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354, 359 (1984); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250 (1980); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v.
United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972) (per curiam); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148,
150 (1956); United States v. Dixon, 347 U.S. 381, 385 (1954); United States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317
U.S. 537, 549 (1943).
24. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362.
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[the legislature], in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly
or impliedly a preference for one label or the other."' Second, where the legislature
has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, one must question "whether the
statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that
intention."' With respect to the second aspect of this inquiry, "'[o]nly the clearest
proof that the purpose and effect of the [sanction] are punitive will suffice to
override [the legislature's] manifest preference for a civil sanction."' Among the
factors that should be considered in determining whether a particular sanction is penal
in nature are:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence,
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned. . ..
As the Supreme Court has noted, however, "[t]his list of considerations is. . . 'neither
exhaustive nor dispositive."''
Applying this standard in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms," the
Supreme Court concluded that the forfeiture mechanism of the Gun Control Act of
1968"' is "not an additional penalty for the commission of a criminal act, but rather
[is] a separate civil sanction, remedial in nature,"'32 aimed at "[k]eeping potentially
dangerous weapons out of the hands of unlicensed [gun] dealers."33 Therefore, an
in rem forfeiture proceeding under that Act is a civil proceeding to which the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not apply?4 Accordingly, the Court held that a gun owner's
25. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).
26. Id. at 362-63 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248).
27. Id. at 365 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).
28. Id. at 365 n.7 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).
29. Id. (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).
30. 465 U.S. 354 (1984) (disapproving Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886)).
31. At the time of the forfeiture proceeding in One Assortment of 89 Firearms, the forfeiture
provision of the Gun Control Act of 1968, read:
Any firearm or ammunition involved in or used or intended to be used in, any violation
of the provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, or any
violation of any other criminal law of the United States, shall be subject to seizure and
forfeiture and all provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 relating to the seizure,
forfeiture, and disposition of firearms, as defined in section 5845(a) of that Code, shall,
so far as applicable, extend to seizures and forfeitures under the provisions of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (1976).
32. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 366.
33. Id. at 364.
34. Id. at 366. The Court first concluded that Congress "'indicate[d] clearly that it intended a civil,
not a criminal, sanction.'" Id. at 363. The Court noted that Congress provided that an action to enforce
a forfeiture under the Act was an in rem proceeding and that, "[i]n contrast to the in personam nature
1993]
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acquittal of criminal charges that he had knowingly engaged in the business of
dealing in firearms without a license did not bar a subsequent in rem forfeiture
proceeding against those same firearms based upon their involvement in the same
transaction for which the gun owner had been acquitted."
Similarly, in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States,' the Supreme Court
held that the forfeiture provision contained in the Tariff Act of 1930" imposes a
civil sanction aimed at aiding the enforcement of tariff regulations by preventing
forbidden merchandise from circulating in the country,38 Also, through its monetary
penalty,39 the enforcement is enhanced by "provid[ing] a reasonable form of
of criminal actions, actions in rem have traditionally been viewed as civil proceedings, with jurisdiction
dependent upon seizure of & physical object." Id. The Court also pointed out that Congress created
"distinctly civil procedures," id., for some forfeitures under the Act, namely, authorizing a summary
administrative procedure for forfeiture of items valued at $2500 or less and providing that notice of a
seizure of such an item could be by publication, id. In addition, the Court found it apparent from the
differences in the language between the substantive criminal provisions of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922, and
the forfeiture provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 924(d), that "the forfeiture provisions of § 924(d) were meant to
be broader in scope than the criminal sanctions of § 922(a)(1)," id. at 364, the substantive criminal
provision under which the claimant had been prosecuted. Id. at 363-64. Finally, the Court concluded that
the forfeiture provision "play3 an important role in furthering the prophylactic purposes of the 1968 gun
control legislation by discouraging unregulated commerce in firearms and by removing from circulation
firearms that have been used or intended for use outside regulated channels of commerce," id. at 364,
a goal the Court characterized as "plainly more remedial than punitive," id.
With respect to the second part of the inquiry - whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either
in purpose or effect as to negate the legislature's intention to establish a civil remedial mechanism - the
Court found that only one of the factors relevant in determining whether a sanction is punitive or
remedial - the fact that condIuct giving rise to forfeiture proceedings under § 924(d) also could entail
'the criminal penalties of § 922(a)(1) - suggested that § 924(d) imposed a criminal penalty. After noting
that Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same conduct, the Court
found that, "[b]ecause the sanction embodied in § 924(d) is not limited to criminal misconduct, the
forfeiture remedy cannot be said to be co-extensive with the criminal penalty." Id. at 366. It then
concluded that "[w]hat overlap there is between the two sanctions is not sufficient to persuade us that
the forfeiture proceeding may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature." Id.
35. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 366. The Court also concluded that the difference
in the relative burdens of proof in criminal and civil proceedings precluded application of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel to bar the forfeiture proceeding. The Court pointed out that the gun owner's
acquittal of the criminal charge did not prove he was innocent; it merely proved the existence of a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Id. at 361. Thus, the jury verdict in the criminal proceeding "did not
negate the possibility that a preponderance of the evidence could show that [the gun owner] was engaged
in an unlicensed firearms business." Id. at 362.
36. 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam).
37. At the time of the fofeiture proceeding in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, the relevant section of
the Tariff Act of 1930 provided:
Any article not included in the declaration and entry as made, and, before examination
of the baggage was begun, not mentioned in writing by such person, if written declaration
and entry was required, or orally if written declaration and entry was not required, shall
be subject to forfeiture and such person shall be liable to a penalty equal to the value of
such article.
19 U.S.C. § 1497 (1964).
38. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 236-37.
39. In addition to the forfeiture of the undeclared article, the provision imposed a monetary penalty
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liquidated damages for violation of the inspection provisions and serv[ing] to
reimburse the Government for investigation and enforcement expenses."'  In
reaching this result, the Court stated:
[S]uch purposes characterize remedial rather than punitive sanctions.
Moreover, it cannot be said that the measure of recovery fixed by
Congress in [the statute] is so unreasonable or excessive that it trans-
forms what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty.
Forfeiture of goods or their value and the payment of fixed or variable
sums of money are other sanctions which have been recognized as
enforceable by civil proceedings . . . . In spite of their comparative
severity, such sanctions have been upheld against the contention that they
are essentially criminal and subject to the procedural rules governing
criminal prosecutions!'
Accordingly, the Court held that a forfeiture action instituted by the government
against certain articles alleged to have been brought into the country without the
required declaration was not barred by their owner's prior acquittal of smuggling
those same articles into the country without submitting to the required customs
procedures'
equal to the value of the article. See supra note 37.
40. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 237.
41. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 (1938)).
The Court also noted that the forfeiture provision fell within the title of the Tariff Act containing the
"Administrative Provisions" and was part of the section entitled "Ascertainment, Collection, and Recovery
of Duties," while another provision of the Act, which imposed what were clearly criminal sanctions, was
part of the statute entitled "Enforcement Provisions" and became part of the Criminal Code of the United
States. This led the Court to conclude that Congress intended "both civil and criminal sanctions, clearly
distinguishing them," id. at 236, and that "[tihere [was] no reason for frustrating that design." Id. at 236-
37.
42. Id. The owner had been charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 545 by willfully and knowingly,
with intent to defraud the United States, smuggling one lot of emerald cut stones and a ring into the
United States without submitting to the required customs procedures.
The Court also concluded that collateral estoppel did not bar the forfeiture proceeding because the
owner's "acquittal on the criminal charge did not necessarily resolve the issues in the forfeiture action."
Id. at 234. The Court noted that to secure a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 545 the prosecution had to
prove the physical act of unlawful importation as well as a knowing and willful intent to defraud the
United States, while to succeed in the forfeiture proceeding it only had to prove that the property was
brought into the United States without the required declaration. Id. Thus, an acquittal on the criminal
charge could have involved a finding that the physical act was not done with the requisite intent. Under
such circumstances, the acquittal "may not be regarded as a determination that the property was not
unlawfully brought into the United States, and the forfeiture proceeding will not involve an issue
previously litigated and finally determined between these parties." Id. at 234-35 & n.5 (distinguishing
Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886)). Moreover, the Court concluded that the difference in the
burdens of proof in criminal and civil cases precluded application of the collateral estoppel doctrine,
because "[t] he acquittal of the criminal charges may have only represented 'an adjudication that the proof
was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused."' Id. at 235 (quoting
Helvering, 303 U.S. at 397) (original quotation marks deleted). The Court stated: "As to the issues
1993]
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In Helvering v. Mitchell,43 the Supreme Court held that an action brought by the
government under the. Revenue Act of 1928 to collect a tax deficiency and a 50%
penalty from a taxpayer who fraudulently underpaid his income taxes was a civil
proceeding." The Court concluded that the sanction of an addition to the unpaid tax
was remedial in chazacter,4 primarily intended to serve as a safeguard for the
protection of the revenue and to reimburse the government for its expens~s in
investigating the fraud and for the resulting loss from the fraud.' Consequently, the
Court held that a taxpayer's prior acquittal in a criminal action for willfully
attempting to evade income taxes did not bar the government from seeking recovery,
on account of fraud, a 50% penalty for failing to pay those same taxes.47
Additionally, in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess," a qui tam action by
private plaintiffs in the name of the United States against a group of electrical
contractors who allegedly defrauded the government, the Supreme Court concluded
that a proceeding under a statute authorizing recovery of $2000 for each false claim
against the government, double damages, and the costs of the suit was remedial in
character and imposed a civil sanction.49 The Court found that the primary purpose
of the statute was "to provide for restitution to the government of money taken from
it by fraud, and that the device of double damages plus a specific sum was chosen
to make sure that the government would be made completely whole."' The Court
raised, it does not constitute an adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden applicable in
civil proceedings." Id.
43. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
44. Id. at 398-405.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 401. The Court noted that "[florfeiture of goods or their value and the payment of fixed
or variable sums of money are . . . sanctions which have been recognized as enforceable by civil
proceedings since the original revenue law of 1789," id. at 400, and that "[in spite of their comparative
severity, such sanctions have been upheld against the contention that they are essentially criminal and
subject to the procedural rules governing criminal prosecutions," id. The Court also pointed out that
Congress provided that colection of the 50% penalty could be made "by distraint," a distinctly civil
procedure that could not constitutionally be used to collect a criminal sanction. Id. at 402. Finally, the
Court noted that the Revenue Act of 1928 "contains two separate and distinct provisions imposing
sanctions," id. at 404, one appearing in the section entitled "Penalties" and imposing a fine and
imprisonment, sanctions th..t are clearly criminal in character, and the other, which includes the 50%
penalty, appearing in the section entitled "Interest and Additions to the Tax," id. at 404-05, thereby
indicating that the latter sanction "was clearly intended as a civil one," id. at 405,
47. Id. at 406. The Court also held that "[tihe difference in degree of the burden of proof in criminal
and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of resjudicata" to bar the claim for the 50% penalty.
Id. at 397. The Court explained that "[tihe acquittal [in the criminal action] was 'merely . . . an
adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.' It did not determine that [the taxpayer] had not willfully attempted to evade the tax." Id.
(citation omitted). The difference in the degree of proof required in the civil case also led the Court to
conclude that the rule of Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886), incorporating notions of collateral
estoppel and double jeopardy, did not apply. Id. at 405-06.
48. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
49. Id. at 549.
50. Id. at 551-52; see also id. at 549 ("We cannot say that the remedy now before us requiring
payment of a lump sum and double damages will do more than afford the government complete
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therefore held that the action was not barred by the defendants' previous plea of nolo
contendere and fine of $54,000 on an indictment for defrauding the government in
connection with the same transactions."
IV. United States v. Halper
The guarantee against double jeopardy generally does not apply in proceedings in
which only a civil sanction can be imposed. However, the Supreme Court held in
United States v. Halper" that, under certain circumstances, a civil penalty imposed
by the government can constitute "punishment" for the purposes of double jeopardy
analysis. 3
Halper, the manager of a company that provided medical services to patients
eligible for benefits under the Medicare program, submitted to the federal govern-
ment, through a fiscal intermediary, sixty-five separate false claims for reimburse-
ment for services rendered. As a result, the government overpaid the company a total
of $585.' Halper subsequently was convicted on sixty-five counts of violating the
criminal false-claims statute' and sixteen counts of mail fraud, and was sentenced
to two years' imprisonment and a fine of $5000.
indemnity for the injuries done it."). The Court noted that the statute in question made "elaborate
provisions both for a criminal punishment and a civil remedy." Id. It went on to state that the remedy
did "not lose the quality of a civil action because more than the precise amount of so-called actual
damage is recovered." Id. at 550. The Court reasoned:
As to the double damage provision, it can not be said that there is any recovery in excess
of actual loss for the government, since in the nature of the qui tam action the
government's half of the double damages is the amount of actual damages proved. But
in any case, Congress might have provided here as it did in the anti-trust laws for
recovery of "threefold the damages *** sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee." Congress could remain fully in the common law tradition and
still provide punitive damages. "By the common as well as by statute law, men are often
punished for aggravated misconduct or lawless acts, by means of a civil action, and the
damages inflicted by way of penalty or punishment, given to the party injured." This
Court has noted the general practice in state statutes of allowing double or treble or even
quadruple damages. Punitive or exemplary damages have been held recoverable under a
statute like this which combines provision for criminal punishment with others which
afford a civil remedy to the individual injured. The law can provide the same measure of
damage for the government as it can for an individual.
Id. at 550-51 (citations and footnote omitted). The Court also rejected the argument that the $2000
penalty was "criminal" rather than "civil" because the statute provided that a person who committed a
prohibited act shall "forfeit and pay" that amount to the government. Id. It concluded that "[t]he words
'forfeit and pay' are wholly consistent with a civil action for damages." Id. at 551.
51. Id. at 548-52.
52. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
53. Id. at 448.
54. Halper mischaracterized the medical service performed by the company, demanding
reimbursement at the rate of $12 per claim when the actual service rendered entitled it to only $3 per
claim. Id. at 437 & n.2.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988) (prohibiting a person from "mak[ing] or present[ing] ... any claim upon
or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false,
fictitious, or fraudulent").
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The government then brought an action against Halper under the civil False Claims
Act.' The Act provided that a person who "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be
made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or
approved" shall be "liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of
$2,000, an amount equal to 2 times the amount of damages the Government sustains
because of the act of that person, and costs of the civil action." 7 Based upon facts
established by Halper's criminal conviction and incorporated in the civil suit, the trial
court granted summary judgment for the government on the issue of liability."5 With
respect to the remedy, however, the court concluded that the penalty called for by the
False Claims Act - at least $130,000 ($2000 for each of sixty-five separate
violations) - would constitute "punishment" and, in light of Halper's previous
criminal punishment, would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by punishing him
a second time for the same conduct.59 The court recognized that the civil sanction
of $2000 plus double damages for each false claim was designed to make the
government whole, and therefore was not itself criminal punishment. Nevertheless,
the court found that the authorized recovery of $130,000 would constitute a second
"punishment" for double jeopardy purposes because it bore no "rational relation" to
the sum of the government's actual loss of $585 plus its costs in investigating and
prosecuting Halper's false claims.' Therefore, the court limited the government's
recovery to double damages of $1170 and the costs of the civil action.6'
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that in a particular case
a civil sanction imposed by the government may constitute "punishment" for purposes
of double jeopardy analysis.62 Accordingly, it held that under the double jeopardy
provision, an individual who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution
may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction based upon the same conduct,
to the extent that the second sanction constitutes "punishment."'
The Court began its analysis by rejecting the government's contention that the
holdings in Helvering v. Mitchell," United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,' and Rex
56. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1982 & Supp. 111984).
57. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982 & Supp. H 1984). The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986
increased the civil penalty to "not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000 plus 3 times the amount
of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person," and "the costs of a civil
action brought to recover any such penalty or damages." 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1988).
58. United States v. -lalrer, 660 F. Supp. 531, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
59. Id. at 533-34.
60. Id.
61. Halper, 664 F. Supp, 852, 854-55 (1987). The trial court initially read the $2000-per-count
statutory penalty as discretionary and, approximating the amount necessary to make the government
whole, imposed the full sanction for only eight of the 65 counts. United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp.
531, 533-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) On reconsideration, the trial court confessed error in holding that the
$2000 penalty was not mandatory for each count, but remained firm in its conclusion that the $130,000
penalty could not be imposed without violating the Double Jeopardy Clauses prohibition of multiple
punishments. Halper, 664 F. Supp. at 853-54.
62. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
63. Id. at 448-49.
64. 303 U.S. 391 (1938). For a discussion of the case, see supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
65. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). For a discussion of the case, see supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
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Trailer Co. v. United States' foreclosed the argument that a sanction imposed in a
civil proceeding, and specifically in a civil False Claims Act proceeding, may give
rise to double jeopardyY The Court stated that
66. 350 U.S. 148 (1956). For a discussion of the case, see infra note 67.
67. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441-42, 446. The Court stated that the government had "overread," id. at
441, the holdings of those cases.
Although, taken together, these cases establish that proceedings and penalties under the
civil False Claims Act are indeed civil in nature, and that a civil remedy does not rise to
the level of "punishment" merely because Congress provided for civil recovery in excess
of the Government's actual damages, they do not foreclose the possibility that in a
particular case a civil penalty authorized by the Act may be so extreme and so divorced
from the Government's damages and expenses as to constitute punishment.
Id. at 441-42. The Court found that Mitchell, which involved a proceeding to recover a 50% penalty
from a taxpayer who fraudulently underpaid his income tax, did not address the question of multiple
punishments because the taxpayer previously had been acquitted in a criminal action for willfully
attempting to evade the same taxes and therefore had not yet been punished for his conduct. Id. at 443.
The Court went on to state:
If anything, Justice Brandeis' carefully crafted opinion for the Court [in Mitchell] intimates
that a civil sanction may constitute punishment under some circumstances. [Tihe Court
distinguished between the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against "attempting a
second time to punish criminally" and its prohibition against "merely punishing twice."
The omission of the qualifying adverb "criminally" from the formulation of the prohibition
against double punishment suggests, albeit indirectly, that "punishment" indeed may arise
from either criminal or civil proceedings.
Id. (citation omitted). The Court found that Hess, which involved a qui tam action brought by private
plaintiffs in the name of the United States to recover double damages and a civil penalty of $2000 for
each of 56 false claims made against the government by electrical contractors who previously had been
fined $54,000 after pleading nolo contendere to an indictment charging them with defrauding the govern-
ment, was "closer to the point," id., but nonetheless did not preclude the trial court's judgment. Id. The
Court reasoned that the government's share of the recovery in Hess ($150,000) roughly equaled the actual
costs to the government (actual damages of $101,500 plus such ancillary costs as those of detecting and
investigating fraudulent practices directed at the government), and that therefore,
in rejecting the defendants' double jeopardy claim [in Hess], the Court simply did not face
the stark situation presently before us where the recovery is exponentially greater than the
amount of the fraud, and, at least in the District Court's informed view, is also many times
the amount of the Government's total loss.
Id. at 445. The Court reached the same conclusion with respect to Rex Trailer, which involved a civil
action under the Surplus Property Act of 1944 to recover the statutory remedy of $2000 for each of five
fraudulent purchases of trucks by a company that previously had pleaded nolo contendere to criminal
charges based upon the same fraudulent transactions and paid fines aggregating $25,000. The Court
stated:
The Court [in Rex Trailer] rejected the defendants' claim that the $2000-per-count penalty
[, which the Court in Rex Trailer considered "comparable to the recovery under
liquidated-damage provisions which fix compensation for anticipated loss,"] constituted
a second punishment. Although the Court recognized that the Government's actual loss
due to the defendants' fraud was difficult if not impossible to ascertain, it recognized that
the Government did sustain injury due to the resultant decrease of motor vehicles
available to Government agencies, an increase in undesirable speculation, and damage to
its program of promoting bona fide sales to veterans. Since the function of a liquidated
damages provision was to provide a measure of recovery where damages are difficult to
quantify, the Court found on the record before it - where the defendants were liable for
only $10,000 - that they had not been subjected to a "measure of recovery . . . so
19931
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[t]he relevant teathing of these cases is that the Government is entitled
to rough remedial justice, that is, it may demand compensation according
to somewhat imprecise formulas, such as reasonable liquidated damages
or a fixed sum plus double damages, without being deemed to have
imposed a second punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy
analysis.
The Court concluded, however, that none of these cases decided "what the Constitu-
tion commands when one of those imprecise formulas authorizes a supposedly
remedial sanction that does not remotely approximate the Government's damages and
actual costs, and rough justice becomes clear injustice. '
In answering that question, the Court rejected the government's argument that
"punishment," for purloses of double jeopardy analysis, can be imposed only in
criminal proceedings, and that whether particular proceedings are criminal or civil in
nature is a matter of statutory construction. The Court found that recourse to
statutory language, structure, and intent, while appropriate in identifying the inherent
nature of a proceeding, or in determining the constitutional safeguards that apply in
those proceedings as e. general matter, "is not well suited to the context of the
'humane interests' safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of
multiple punishments. '" Rather, the Court concluded that because of the "intrinsi-
cally personal"'" nature of the protection against double jeopardy, "[i]ts violation can
be identified only by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the
individual by the machinery of the state."'
With respect to the circumstances under which a "civil" sanction constitutes
"punishment" for purpcses of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court stated:
[T]he labels "criminal" and "civil" are not of paramount importance. It
is commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive as
well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial
goals may be served by criminal penalties. The notion of punishment, as
we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the civil
and the criminal law, and for the purposes of assessing whether a given
sanction constitutes multiple punishment barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause, we must follow the notion where it leads. To that end, the
determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment in
the relevant sens.s requires a particularized assessment of the penalty
imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve.
Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment
unreasonable or excessive" as to constitute a second criminal punishment in violation of
double jeopardy.
Id. at 445-46 (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 446.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 447.
71. Id.
72. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of
punishment.
These goals are familiar. We have recognized in other contexts that
punishment serves.the twin aims of retribution and deterrence. Further-
more, "[r]etribution and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive
governmental objectives." From these premises, it follows that a civil
sanction that cannot fairly be said to serve a remedial purpose, but rather
can be explained only as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand that term.7
The Court held that "under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has
been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil
sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as
remedial, but only as a deterrent."'74
The Court emphasized, however, that cases in which a civil sanction constitutes
"punishment" will not arise often. It stated that it "cast no shadow on [the] time-
honored judgments"'75 that neither a reasonable liquidated damage clause nor, in the
ordinary case, a fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages provision constitutes "punish-
ment" for double jeopardy purposes.76 Additionally, the Court stated:
73. Id. at 447-48 (footnote and citations omitted). The Court made it clear that whether a particular
sanction constitutes punishment should not be determined from the defendant's perspective, because "for
the defendant even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment." Id. at 447 n.7. Rather, "it is the
purposes actually served by the sanction in question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving
rise to the sanction, that must be evaluated." Id. Justice Kennedy, in a brief concurring opinion, stressed
that the Court's holding in Halper.
constitutes an objective rule that is grounded in the nature of the sanction and the facts
of the particular case. It does not authorize courts to undertake a broad inquiry into the
subjective purposes that may be thought to lie behind a given judicial proceeding. Such
an inquiry would be amorphous and speculative, and would mire the courts in the
quagmire of differentiating among the multiple purposes that underlie every proceeding,
whether it be civil or criminal in name. It also would breed confusion among legislators
who seek to structure the mechanisms of proper law enforcement within constitutional
commands. In approaching the sometimes difficult question whether an enactment
constitutes what must be deemed a punishment, we have recognized that a number of
objective factors bear on the inquiry. In the case before us, I agree with the Court that the
controlling circumstance is whether the civil penalty imposed in the second proceeding
bears any rational relation to the damages suffered by the Government.
Id. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 448-49. The Court acknowledged that the determination of whether a particular sanction
constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes "will not be an exact pursuit," id. at 449, because
"the precise amount of the Government's damages and costs may prove to be difficult, if not impossible,
to ascertain," id., and because it will be "difficult if not impossible in many cases for a court to determine
the precise dollar figure at which a civil sanction has accomplished its remedial purpose of making the
Government whole, but beyond which the sanction takes on the quality of punishment." Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. In a subsequent footnote, the Court stated:
It hardly seems necessary to state that a suit under the [False Claims] Act alleging one
or two false claims would satisfy the rational-relationship requirement. It is only when a
sizable number of false claims is present that, as a practical matter, the issue of double
1993]
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What we announce now is a rule for the rare case, the case such as the
one before us, where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but
small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to
the damages he has caused. The rule is one of reason: Where a
defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty and the civil
penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational relation to
the goal of comlensating the Government for its loss, but rather appears
to qualify as "punishment" in the plain meaning of the word, then the
defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Government's damages and
costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact constitutes a second
punishment. We must leave to the trial court the discretion to determine
on the basis of such an accounting the size of the civil sanction the
Government may receive without crossing the line between remedy and
punishment.'
Applying this standard to the facts before it, the Court concluded that the disparity
between the civil penalty authorized by the statute ($130,000 for false claims made
to the government amounting to $585) and the trial court's approximation of the
government's costs arising from the fraud ($16,000) was sufficiently disproportionate
that the sanction constituted "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. 8 It further
concluded that imposition of such a sanction would violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause because the defendant already had been convicted in a criminal prosecution
for the same conduct and sentenced to a jail term and a fine of $5000.V Neverthe-
less, the Court remanded the case to the trial court to afford the government an
opportunity to present an accounting of its actual costs arising from the defendant's
fraud, to seek an adjustment of the trial court's approximation of its costs and to
recover its demonstrated costs.'
V. Criminal Prosecution Following Imposition
of "Punishment" in a Civil Proceeding
Halper involved the imposition of a civil sanction in a separate proceeding
following the defendant's criminal conviction and punishment for the same conduct.
Indeed, the precise holding of the Supreme Court in Halper was that "under the
jeopardy may arise.
Id. at 451 n.12.
77. Id. at 449-50 (footrote omitted). The Court made it clear that its decision does not "precludet
the Government from seeking the full civil penalty against a defendant who previously has not been
punished for the same conduct, even if the civil sanction imposed is punitive," id. at 450, or "from
seeking and obtaining bath the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized criminal
penalties in the same proceeding," id., and that it also does not "precludeo a private party from filing
a civil suit seeking damages for conduct that previously was the subject of criminal prosecution and
punishment," id. at 451. Tha Court expressed no opinion, however, "as to whether a qui tam action..
is properly characterized as a suit between private parties for purposes of this rule." Id. at 451 n.1 1.
78. Id. at 452.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal
prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the
second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent
or retribution.'' Moreover, the Court in Halper limited its holding to the precise
factual situation presented in that case, stating:
[T]he only proscription established by our ruling is that the Government
may not criminally prosecute a defendant, impose a criminal penalty
upon him, and then bring a separate civil action based on the same
conduct and receive a judgment that is not rationally related to the goal
of making the Government whole.'
The question arises, however, whether the Court's reasoning in Halper applies
when the sequence of the proceedings is reversed, that is, when an individual is
prosecuted criminally after she already has been subjected to a civil sanction for the
same conduct and that civil sanction is of such a magnitude that it constitutes
"punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. If so, then one must ask
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause requires dismissal of the criminal charges prior
to trial, or is some other remedy effective to protect the defendant's double jeopardy
rights?
Courts that have considered the first question have "not regard[ed] timing as
crucial"' to the reasoning in Halper and have held that "[i]f in fact a civil sanction
may fairly be characterized 'only as a deterrent or retribution,' then its exaction before
imposition of criminal punishment should have the same double jeopardy effect as
exaction afterwards. ' In answering the second question, courts have concluded that
81. Id. at 448-49 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 451 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
83. United States v. Marcus Schloss & Co., 724 F. Supp. 1123, 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
84. Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839, 843 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992)
("[,V]e see no reason for holding that Halper should apply only to civil proceedings that post-date
criminal ones."); United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193,200 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he order of
proceedings matters not to the analysis ...."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 123 (1992); United States v.
Reed, 937 F.2d 575, 577 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he sequential order of the 'civil' and 'criminal'
proceedings is irrelevant .... ); United States v. Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263, 267 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he
distinction is not significant."); United States v. Mayers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127 (11th Cir.) (per curiam)
("Although in this case the civil penalty preceded, rather than followed the criminal indictment, the
Halper principle that civil penalties can sometimes constitute criminal punishment for double jeopardy
purposes would seem to apply whether the civil penalties come before or after the criminal indictment."),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990); Taylor v. Sherrill, 819 P.2d 921,929 (Ariz. 1991) ("We do not believe
the order of the proceedings is significant."); Johnson v. State, 622 A.2d 199, 203 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1993) ("The rule in Halper has now been extended to factor civil penalties into the double jeopardy
matrix where the civil penalty precedes, as well as follows, criminal proceedings."); State v. Darby, 587
A.2d 1309, 1315-16 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1991); Exparte Rogers, 804 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1990) ("We view this distinction in the timing of the criminal prosecution as irrelevant."); State v.
Strong, 605 A.2d 510, 512 (Vt. 1992) ("[Ihe difference in the timing of the events in this case, in which
the ostensibly civil penalty addressing the same conduct came first, is not determinative."). But see
United States v. Furlett, 781 F. Supp. 536, 541 (N.D. I1. 1991) ("The notion that Halper applies [in this
situation) must give some pause."), affd, 974 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1992).
1993]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
the Double Jeopardy Clause does indeed require dismissal of the criminal charges
prior to trial.'
With respect to the first question, it must of course be conceded that the sequence
of the proceedings is irrelevant to the question of whether the double jeopardy
provision bars a second punishment. There is no principled basis for distinguishing
between a second punishment imposed in a civil proceeding following a criminal
conviction for the same conduct, as in Halper, and a second punishment imposed in
a criminal proceeding following the imposition of "punishment" in a civil proceeding
based upon the same conduct. In both cases, the defendant is being punished twice
for the same offense."
It is by no means certain, however, that the imposition of "punishment" in a civil
proceeding should, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, serve as a bar to a subsequent
criminal prosecution for the same conduct. Under the Supreme Court's holding in
Halper, the government is entitled to convict and punish an individual in a criminal
prosecution and also impose a penalty upon her in a separate civil proceeding, even
though both sanctions ate based upon the same conduct. The only limitation placed
upon this principle by Halper is that the penalty imposed in the civil proceeding not
85. Sanchez-Escareno, 930 F.2d at 203 ("If the defendants actually pay the civil fines [for which
they executed promissory notes], then any subsequent criminal prosecution would be double jeopardy
... [I]f the government attempts to collect on the notes, jeopardy would attach when the court begins
to hear evidence in that action."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 123 (1992); United States v. Walker, 940 F.2d
442, 443 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Neither side disputes that, under... Halper, [t]he Double Jeopardy Clause
would prevent the government from prosecuting Walker for possessing and importing the drug if the civil
penalty the government impoied for bringing the drug through customs without declaring it constitutes
criminal punishment."); Mullett v. Miller, 816 P.2d 251,254-55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) ("In the event that
the administrative penalty [imposed by the Arizona Corporation Commission] is determined to be a
punishment, the underlying criminal proceeding must be dismissed, to the extent that the charges are
based on the same conduct that was the basis of the proceeding before the Commission."), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992); Darby, 587 A.2d at 1316 ("If punitive penalties were imposed [in the civil
proceedings], according to the Halper standard, they serve to bar the State from seeking further
punishment by way of criminal proceedings for the same conduct."); Walker v. State, 828 S.W.2d 485,
490 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) ("Jf the forfeiture does negate the legislature's civil intent, then Walker's
criminal conviction violates his protection from multiple punishments."); Small v. Commonwealth, 402
S.E.2d 927, 928 (Va. Ct. App 1991) (en banc) (reversing trial court for reasons stated in panel opinion
at 398 S.E.2d 98, 100-01 (Va. Ct. App. 1990)) (holding that S3000 in penalties imposed upon a paving
contractor in a civil contempt proceeding for failing to comply with an order enjoining him from
engaging in certain conduct constituted "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes and barred a
subsequent criminal contempt proceeding based upon the same conduct). But see United States v. Amiel,
813 F. Supp. 958, 961 (E.D.N.Y.) ("By seeking to preempt this criminal prosecution rather than awaiting
the outcome at trial .... defendants' argument appears to be that a substantial civil forfeiture effectively
bars any subsequent criminal prosecution. Such an argument, taken to its logical conclusion, would
seriously undermine efforts at law enforcement."), affd, 995 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1993).
86. See United States v. Mayers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127 (1 lth Cir.) (per curiam) ("Although in this
case the civil penalty precedel, rather than followed the criminal indictment, the Halper principle that
civil penalties can sometimes constitute criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes would seem
to apply whether the civil penelties come before or after the criminal indictment."), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
865 (1990); Furlett, 781 F. Supp. at 542 ("[Tjhere would seem to be no legitimate reason to find that
a civil sanction may constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause only when it is
imposed after a criminal prosecution, and not before.").
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be of such a magnitude as to constitute "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy
analysis." Where a tribunal imposes a civil sanction that an appellate court
subsequently concludes constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes, a
prior criminal conviction and sentence based upon the same conduct will stand, and
the government will be able to obtain the maximum civil penalty permitted by the
Double Jeopardy Clause. This is true because, according to Halper, the appropriate
remedy in that situation is to reduce the amount of the civil penalty to a level that
does not constitute "punishment."' However, if a civil penalty that constitutes
"punishment" for double jeopardy purposes is held to bar the government from
subsequently prosecuting the individual criminally for the same conduct, the
government will be deprived of the opportunity to obtain a criminal conviction and
to impose the full range of permissible sanctions, both criminal and civil, upon the
individual. Such a result appears to be inconsistent with Halper.'
Moreover, because the remedies available in a civil proceeding are limited in
nature and range, barring a subsequent criminal prosecution would preclude the
government from seeking both sanctions of a nature similar to those available in the
civil proceeding, such as a fine, as well as sanctions that are beyond those available
in the civil proceeding, most notably, incarceration.9' The court recognized this
problem in United States v. Furlett,9' a case involving the criminal prosecution of.
two commodities brokers for the same conduct that served as the basis for the
imposition of civil sanctions upon them under the Commodity Exchange Act:'
87. Since the Double Jeopardy Clause allows the imposition of cumulative punishment under two
statutes in a single trial, so long as the total punishment does not exceed that authorized by the
legislature, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983), the government can "seek[] and
obtainD both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in the
same proceeding." Halper, 490 U.S. at 450.
88. Halper, 490 U.S. at 452.
89. See Amiel, 813 F. Supp. at 961.
90. Furlett, 781 F. Supp. at 541.
91. 781 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. I1. 1991), affd, 974 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1992).
92. In Furlett, an administrative law judge, acting upon a complaint filed against two commodities
brokers by the Division of Enforcement of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),
concluded that the brokers had violated various sections of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§
1-26 (1988), by committing fraud in the trading of commodity futures contracts. Furlet, 781 F. Supp.
at 538. As sanctions, the administrative law judge revoked the CFTC registrations of the two brokers,
prohibited them from trading on or subject to the rules of any contract market, ordered them to cease and
desist from any further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, and imposed a civil penalty of
$75,000 upon each of them. The government subsequently obtained an indictment charging the two
brokers with various criminal offenses based upon the same conduct that was the subject of the
proceeding before the administrative law judge. Prior to trial, the brokers moved to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that it was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, because they previously had
been punished by the CFTC for the same conduct. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the
civil sanctions imposed by the CFTC were remedial measures only and therefore did not constitute
"punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. ld. at 543-48. Although the court assumed that Halper's
double jeopardy analysis applies where imposition of the civil penalty precedes the criminal prosecution
for the same conduct, it acknowledged that that result is not self-evident. It stated that "[t]he notion that
Halper applies to cases like this one must give some pause," id. at 541, and pointed out that "there are
grounds to wonder whether Halper should be applied in a rote manner here," id.
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To a great extent, proceedings before the [Commodities Futures Trading
Commission] are designed to ensure the integrity of the commodities
markets. The remedies available to the government are commensurate
with this purpose. Consequently, although an ALl [administrative law
judge] may enjoy relatively broad authority to revoke registrations,
prohibit further violations, impose fines, and fashion other appropriate
remedies when rules are violated, her powers do not extend so far as
those an Article HI judge possesses under the criminal laws. Most
obviously, an ALJ cannot impose a term of incarceration.93
These problems are compounded when the criminal prosecution is brought while
the judgment in the civil proceeding is under review and, hence, not yet final.' If
the trial court finds th, criminal charges are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause
and dismisses them accordingly,"5 and the sanctions imposed in the civil proceeding
subsequently are vacated or modified to an extent that they do not constitute "punish-
ment," the offender might avoid not only a criminal conviction, but also all
"punishment" for her misconduct. s To make matters worse, the dismissal of the
criminal charges would not in fact have been required by the double jeopardy
provision.
93. Id. (citations omittal).
94. Id. at 541-42; e.g., United States v. Amid, 995 R2d 367, 368 (2d Cir. 1993) (although
defendants, with the agreement of the government and the approval of the court, withdrew their appeal
without prejudice to its reinstatement within 30 days after the district court ruled on their motion to
dismiss the indictment against them).
95. The trial court may, however, deny the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that it
would be premature to deide the double jeopardy issue until after resolution of the appeal of the
sanctions imposed in the civil proceeding. Amie!, 995 F.2d at 370.
96. Even if the prosecutor could reinstate the criminal charges against the individual without running
afoul of either the Double Jeopardy Clause, see, e.g., Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387-94
(1975) (holding that where a trial court grants a defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment prior
to the attachment of jeopardy, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the government from appealing
that ruling and, if successftl, from trying the defendant upon the original indictment); see also United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 94-101 (1978) (holding that where a trial court grants a defendant's motion
to dismiss an indictment after the attachment of jeopardy, but before a determination of her guilt or
innocence, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the government from appealing that ruling and, if
successful, from trying the defendant upon the original indictment), or the speedy trial provisions of the
Constitution, see, e.g., United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 310-12 (1986) (stating that when a
court dismisses charges against a defendant and those charges subsequently are reinstated, the period
during which no charges were pending generally does not weigh towards a Sixth Amendment speedy trial
claim); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783,790 (1977) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires
dismissal of charges for pre-accusation delay only when compelling the defendant to stand trial would
"violate[] those 'fundamental concepts of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political
institutions' ... and which define the community's sense of fair play and decency"); see also United
States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (holding that the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to the period between the government's good faith dismissal of charges and
the subsequent reinstatemert of those charges), obtaining a conviction probably would be more difficult
because of the intervening delay. Witnesses may have died or otherwise become unavailable; memories
may have faded; and physical evidence may have been lost or destroyed.
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Sixth Amendment concerns also might arise if a civil sanction deemed to be
"punishment" for double jeopardy purposes were held to bar a subsequent criminal
prosecution for the same conduct. The court in Furlett recognized this problem,
stating:
If the doors to a later criminal prosecution may be closed depending on
the type and severity of sanctions an administrative law judge decides to
impose, the government and the prospective defendant alike have a keen
stake in how those sanctions are framed. Oddly enough, the traditional
interests of the parties may be reversed in this setting: The government
likely will not want whatever administrative sanctions are imposed to be
so severe that they might bar separate criminal proceedings; on the other
hand, the prospective defendant may well want the sanctions to be just
harsh enough that he can invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause and escape
a criminal trial and the possibility of a jail term. Courts traditionally
have been reluctant to impose upon administrative investigations and
other proceedings the rigorous requirements which the Constitution
demands of criminal prosecutions. Rules which up the constitutional ante
in the administrative setting may well render this line of authority
obsolete. If the outcome of an administrative charge against an individual
can determine whether or not the government has the right to indict that
person, for example, it becomes difficult to see why certain of the
safeguards which attend criminal prosecutions should not be imposed in
the administrative context.
One could of course argue that the government can avoid these problems by
bringing the criminal prosecution before attempting to impose any civil sanctions, and
that the government, therefore, should be required to make a choice: prosecute the
criminal action first or suffer the possibility that the relief obtained in a civil
proceeding might be deemed "punishment," thereby foreclosing the possible criminal
conviction and the wider array of criminal penalties available." However, "[s]uch
a rule might have far-reaching ramifications."" As the Furlett court explained,
In effect, regulatory bodies ... would be prevented from proceeding
expeditiously on administrative charges and forced to await the resolution
97. Furlett, 781 F. Supp. at 542 (citations omitted). But see Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 (stating that
"[Tihis Court has followed [the] abstract approach [of using statutory construction to decide whether
proceedings are criminal or civil] when determining whether the procedural protections of the Sixth
Amendment apply to proceedings under a given statute."); United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954
F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir.) (holding that "Mhe applicability of Sixth Amendment protections to statutory
proceedings ... are determined not with reference to the particular sanction ultimately imposed, but
rather by considering the proceeding's inherent nature ...."), cert. denied., 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
98. See Furlett, 781 F. Supp. at 542; cf. United States v. Park, 947 F.2d 130, 133 (5th Cir. 1991)
(when the defendant waived his right to immediate civil forfeiture proceedings, the Customs Service held
those proceedings in abeyance pending the outcome of the criminal prosecution of defendant), vacated
in part on grant of reh'g on another issue, 951 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1992).
99. Furlett, 781 F. Supp. at 542.
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of criminal prosecutions which arise from the same set of facts. The
wheels of criminal justice often grind slowly; months or years might pass
while the criminal proceedings were resolved, and witnesses and other
evidence might vanish in the interim. The resulting delays would
effectively hamstring regulatory agencies in their efforts to serve their
roles as overseers, depriving them of their ability to work concurrently
with prosecutors.
It therefore must be asked whether, in a situation where "punishment" has already
been imposed upon an individual in a civil proceeding, there is any way to avoid the
imposition of a second punishment without barring a subsequent criminal prosecution
of that individual. One possibility is to allow the government to return, before the
criminal trial, to the tribunal that imposed the civil sanction and have that sanction
reduced to a level that does not constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy
purposes. 0'
However, two Supreme Court cases indicate that, at least where the defendant
already has suffered the "punishment" imposed in the civil proceeding, for example,
by paying a civil fine, the government cannot avoid the limitations of the Double
Jeopardy Clause in this manner." In Ex parte Lange,'°3 the defendant was
convicted of stealing mail bags, a federal offense punishable by either imprisonment
for up to one year or a fine not exceeding $200. Nevertheless, the trial court
sentenced the defendant to one year's imprisonment and a fine of $200. The
defendant began serving his jail sentence and paid the fine to the clerk of the court,
who, in turn, paid the money into the treasury of the United States, where it was
beyond the legal control of the court. Five days after the defendant had begun
serving the jail sentence, the trial court, recognizing its error, vacated the judgment
and sentenced the defendant to imprisonment for one year from that date. The
Supreme Court discharged the defendant, holding that because he already had paid
the fine, the second sentence imposed by the trial court was invalid under the Double
Jeopardy Clause as a second punishment for the same offense."°' The Court first
noted that if the secord sentence were enforced, the defendant would end up paying
a $200 fine and serving one year and five days in jail. It then stated:
We are of the opinion that when the prisoner, as in this case, by
reason of a valid judgment, had fully suffered one of the alternative
punishments to which alone the law subjected him, the power of the
court to punish further was gone. [The Double Jeopardy Clause] then
100. Id.
101. See State v. Darby, 587 A.2d 1309, 1316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) ("We need not decide
whether the double jeopardy bar to criminal proceedings can be removed by returning, before the
criminal trial, to the Chanery Division to reduce to a legitimate level the monetary penalties already
imposed there. The State has made no effort to take that course."), cert. denied, 598 A.2d 898 (N.J.
1991).
102. See In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943); Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
103. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
104. Il at 176-78.
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interposed its shield, and forbid that he should be punished again for that
offence.'"
Similarly, in In re Bradley," the defendant was sentenced for criminal contempt
to six months' imprisonment and a fine of $500 under a statute providing only for
imprisonment or a fine. Three days after the defendant had begun serving the jail
sentence, his attorney paid the fine in cash to the clerk of the court. That same day
the trial court realized its mistake, amended its sentencing order by omitting the fine,
and instructed the clerk to return the money to the defendant's attorney, who refused
to accept it. Relying upon Lange, the Supreme Court held that the defendant was
entitled to be released."° It stated that because the defendant had fully satisfied one
of the alternative penalties of the statute, "the power of the court was at an end,""
and that the subsequent attempt to avoid satisfaction of the judgment by amending
the sentence was a "nullity.""9
Therefore, Lange and Bradley indicate that, at least where the defendant has
suffered the "punishment" imposed in the civil proceeding, the government cannot
avoid the restrictions of the Double Jeopardy Clause by reducing the sanction
imposed in the civil proceeding to a level that does not constitute "punishment" and
returning the difference to the defendant. A defendant in that situation - like the
defendants in Lange and Bradley - has been "punished" already for her conduct,
and under the holdings in Lange and Bradley, "the power of the court[s] to punish
further [is] gone.."
105. Id. at 176.
106. 318 U.S. 50 (1943).
107. Id. at 52.
108. Id.
109. Id. The Court said it was unimportant that the fine had not yet been paid into the treasury
because it was paid to the clerk of the court, who was the governmental officer authorized to receive it,
and the defendant's rights "did not depend upon what the officer subsequently did with the money." Id.
110. Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 (1874); accord In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 52
(1943). The Supreme Court held in United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931), that a trial court does
not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by reconsidering and reducing a sentence during the same term
in which it imposed that sentence. Id. at 307. In the situation discussed in the text, the government
would be asking the tribunal that imposed the civil penalty to reduce that penalty to a level that would
not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes, which at first glance would seem to be
permissible under Benz. However, unlike the situation in Benz, where the trial court merely imposed a
lesser sentence upon the defendant, in the present context, the government (in most cases) ultimately
would be seeking to increase the severity of the sentence from that initially imposed upon the defendant.
That is, the government is seeking to reduce the civil penalty so that it can obtain a criminal conviction
of the defendant and impose either a period of incarceration, a fine, or both.
Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947), also is inapplicable in the situation being discussed in
the text. In Bozza, the defendant was convicted under a statute providing for a minimum mandatory
sentence of a $100 fine and imprisonment. The trial court erroneously sentenced the defendant to a term
of imprisonment only. About five hours after announcing the sentence, the trial court recalled the
defendant from a local federal detention jail, where he was awaiting transportation to the penitentiary,
and imposed the mandatory fine. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that the trial
court's action in increasing the defendant's punishment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court
stated:
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Later Supreme Court cases, however, have limited the scope of Lange and
Bradley. In United States v. DiFrancesco,"' the Supreme Court indicated that the
second sentence imposed by the trial court in Lange violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause's prohibition against multiple punishment,"2 not because it was imposed
after the defendant had fully satisfied one of the alternative punishments contained
in the statute, but because it would have resulted in the defendant receiving a greater
sentence than the legi:slature had authorized, that is, a fine and imprisonment instead
of merely a fine or iraprisonment."3
The Supreme Court also read Lange narrowly in Jones v. Thomas."4 There, the
criminal defendant was convicted in a single proceeding of attempted robbery and
first-degree felony murder for killing during the attempted robbery. The trial court
sentenced him to consecutive terms of fifteen years for the attempted robbery and life
imprisonment for the J.elony murder, with the attempted robbery sentence to run first.
After the defendant had fully served the attempted robbery sentence,"5 and while
he was in custody under the murder sentence, the trial court, acting upon the
defendant's motion to set aside his sentence, ruled that it had acted improperly in
imposing separate sentences for felony murder and the underlying felony."6 It
vacated the defendant's attempted robbery conviction and fifteen-year sentence, but
did not order his immediate release. Instead, the trial court credited the entire time
he had already served against his sentence for murder."'
If this inadvertent e-rror cannot be corrected in the manner used here by the trial court, no
valid and enforceable sentence can be imposed at all .... In this case the court "only set
aside what it had no authority to do, and substitute[d] directions required by the law to
be done upon le conviction of the offender." It did not twice put [the defendant] in
jeopardy for the sane offense. The sentence as corrected, imposes a valid punishment for
an offense instead cof an invalid punishment for that offense.
Id. at 166-67. The Court distinguished Lange on the ground that Lange had fully satisfied one of the
alternative punishments at the time of the resentencing, whereas Bozza did not suffer any lawful
punishment until the trial ourt announced the full mandatory sentence of imprisonment and fine. Id. at
167 n.2. In the situation being discussed in the text, however, the sanction initially imposed in the civil
proceeding was not unlawful, and therefore any alteration of that sentence would not merely be an
attempt to correct an "inadvertent error."
111. 449 U.S. 117 (1980) (holding that the portion of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
granting the government the right, under specified conditions, to appeal a sentence imposed upon a
convicted "dangerous special offender" does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause).
112. Id. at 139.
113. Id.; see also id. at 138-39 (limiting to Lange's specific context dictum in United States v. Benz,
282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931), to the effect that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a trial court from
increasing a sentence once the defendant has begun serving the sentence).
114. 491 U.S. 376 (1989).
115. Several years after the defendant began serving the sentence for attempted robbery, that
sentence was commuted.
116. While the defendant's motion to set aside his sentence was pending, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that the state legislature had not intended to allow separate and cumulative punishments under
the felony murder statute for both the murder and the underlying felony that produced the homicide.
State v. Morgan, 612 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1981) (en banc); State v. Olds, 603 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. 1980) (en
banc).
117. The Missouri Court ofAppeals affirmed thisjudgment. Thomas v. State, 665 S.W.2d 621 (Mo.
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The Supreme Court held that the trial court's remedy "fully vindicated [the
defendant's] double jeopardy rights,""' rejecting the criminal defendant's argument,
based upon Lange and Bradley, that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the
immediate release of a prisoner who has satisfied the shorter of two consecutive
sentences that could not both lawfully be imposed."9 The Court acknowledged that
"Lange and Bradley do contain language to the effect that once a defendant 'had fully
suffered one of the alternative punishments to which alone the law subjected him, the
power of the court to punish further was gone.""'  Nevertheless, it concluded that
application of this language to the facts presented in Jones "is neither compelled by
precedent nor supported by any double jeopardy principle."'' Citing DiFrancesco,
the Court stated that Lange merely "stands for the uncontested proposition that the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits punishment in excess of that authorized by the
legislature, and not for the broader rule suggested by its dictum."'" The Court
acknowledged that Bradley provided "a closer analogy"'" to the case before it,
stating that "[s]trict application of Bradley would support [the defendant] here."'"
Nevertheless, it "decline[d] to extend Bradley beyond its facts."" The Court stated:
We think [that stiict application of Bradley] ignores important differences
between this case and Bradley. Bradley and Lange both involved
alternative punishments that were prescribed by the legislature for a
single criminal act. The issue presented here, however, involves separate
sentences imposed for what the sentencing court thought to be separately
punishable offenses, one far more serious than the other ....
In a true alternative sentence case such as Bradley, it would be
difficult to say that one punishment or the other was intended by the
legislature, for the legislature viewed each alternative as appropriate for
some cases. But here the legislature plainly intended one of two results
for persons who committed murder in the commission of a felony: Either
they were to be convicted of felony murder, or they were to be convicted
separately of the felony and of nonfelony murder. It cannot be suggested
Ct. App. 1983). The defendant then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The district court
denied relief, but a panel of the court of appeals reversed and granted a conditional writ, allowing the
state trial court to change the jeopardy-barred felony murder conviction to a conviction for the non-
jeopardy-barred lesser included offense of (nonfelony) murder and then to resentence the defendant for
that offense. Thomas v. Morris, 816 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1987). On rehearing en banc, the court of
appeals, with four judges dissenting, ordered the defendant's unconditional release, holding that he could
not be punished further once he had satisfied the sentence for attempted robbery. Thomas v. Morris, 844
F.2d 1337 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
118. Jones, 491 U.S. at 382.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 383 (citation omitted).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 387.
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seriously that the legislature intended an attempted robbery conviction to
suffice as an alternative sanction for murder."
As in Jones (but no' Lange and Bradley), the question now being discussed does
not involve a true alternative sentence case. Rather, it is clear that "the legislature
plainly intended"'" to impose both a criminal sanction and a civil sanction upon the
defendant, and, to use the language of Jones, "[iut cannot be suggested seriously that
the legislature intended [a civil sanction] to suffice as an alternative sanction for [the
criminal offense in question]."'' Thus, it can be strongly argued that, under Jones,
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the government from seeking to have the
tribunal that imposed a civil sanction upon a criminal defendant reduce the magnitude
of that sanction to a level that does not constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy
purposes, thereby allowing the government to proceed with the criminal prosecution
of that individual and, if successful, subject her to the prescribed punishment.
On the other hand, in distinguishing Bradley, the Court in Jones pointed out that
"[tihe alternative sentences in Bradley . ..were of a different type, fine and
imprisonment,"'' and stated that "it would not have been possible to 'credit' a fine
against time in prison.""'° The Court in Jones made no mention of the possibility
of the trial court in Bradley ordering the fine returned to the defendant before
resentencing him to a term of imprisonment. It therefore could be argued that Jones
is inapplicable in the present context and that under Bradley (and Lange), the Double
Jeopardy Clause precludes the tribunal that imposed the civil sanction from reducing
that sanction to a level that does not constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy
purposes, "returning" the "difference" to the defendant, and then punishing the
defendant following a criminal prosecution for the same conduct as that involved in
the civil proceeding.'
However, even if tha Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude the government
from seeking to re-open the judgment in the civil proceeding in order to have the
civil sanction imposed upon the defendant reduced so the government can prosecute
her criminally for the same conduct, there may be other obstacles. In some cases, the
civil sanction will have been imposed in a proceeding in which the government was
represented by counsel not on the legal staff of the prosecutor in charge of the
126. Id. at 384-85 (footnote omitted).
127. Id. at 384.
128. Id. at 384-85.
129. Id. at 384.
130. Id.
131. Under this reading of Lange and Bradley, it is not clear whether the same result would be
reached when the defendant has not yet suffered the "punishment" imposed in the civil proceeding. A
rule prohibiting the criminal prosecution of a defendant who, for example, already paid a civil fine that
constitutes "punishment" for purposes of the double jeopardy provision, but allowing such a prosecution
when the fine has not yet been paid, has little to commend it. If payment of the civil fine before the
commencement of a defendaents criminal trial will preclud& the government from prosecuting her, one
can foresee the possibility of untried defendants attempting to force their payments of civil fines upon
reluctant court clerks or otfer government officials in order to "immunize" themselves from criminal
prosecution.
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subsequent criminal action, such as an attorney from an independent administrative
agency with its own staff. For example, in United States v. Furlett,32 attorneys
employed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission represented the
government in an administrative hearing on a complaint against a commodities
broker,' while the local United States Attorney represented the government in the
subsequent criminal prosecution of the broker. In cases such as Furlett, the
prosecutor in the criminal action will not be the proper representative of the
government to seek a reduction in the sanction imposed by the administrative agency.
Moreover, because the concerns of counsel who represented the government in the
civil proceeding might differ substantially from those of the prosecutor in the
criminal action, the former may be unwilling to seek a reduction in the magnitude
of the civil sanction merely because the prosecutor "hopes" to obtain a criminal
conviction of the defendant.
Even if the civil sanction was imposed by a court in an action in which the
government was represented by attorneys on the legal staff of the prosecutor in
charge of the subsequent criminal proceeding, such as where the Civil Division of
the local United States Attorney's Office handled the civil action and the Criminal
Division represents the government in the criminal prosecution, procedural rules may
not allow the government to seek reduction in the magnitude of the sanction. In the
federal courts, for example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a trial
court, "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just," to "relieve" a party from a final
judgment for five rather specific reasons (none of which are relevant here) as well
as for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."''
This residual provision does not, however, empower a trial court to substitute its
132. 974 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1992).
133. See 7 U.S.C. § 4a(c) (1988).
134. Section 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresen-
tation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1),
(2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered
or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment
or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant
relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C. §
1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of corarn nobis, coram
vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are
abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
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judgment of what the appropriate penalty is for the wrongful conduct of a defendant
in place of the penalty mandated by Congress in the applicable statute.'35 Therefore,
a trial court is not allowed to reduce or remit a statutorily mandated civil penalty
because it concludes that the amount of the penalty is excessive when compared with
the gain realized by the defendant's false claims"z or because it thinks that the
sanction would penalize the defendant beyond a degree commensurate with her
culpability.' By like reasoning, the residual clause of Rule 60(b) would not allow
a trial court to disregard a civil penalty mandated by Congress - such as the $2000-
per-false-claim penalty required by the civil False Claims Act in Halper - merely
because, under the facts of the particular case, the penalty was "not rationally related
to the goal of making the Government whole."''
It is true, of course, that the Supreme Court in Halper held that the trial court
could impose a fine less than that mandated by Congress in the civil False Claims
Act.'39 There, however, the criminal prosecution for the same conduct preceded the
civil action, and the Double Jeopardy Clause therefore imposed limits upon the
amount that the trial court could fine the defendant in the civil case. On the other
hand, where a defendant is found liable in a civil action before she has been
prosecuted criminally for the same conduct, the Double Jeopardy Clause is
inapplicable. Therefore, the fine mandated by Congress would not be constitutionally
impermissible and would have to be imposed by the trial court (and could not be
altered by the trial court pursuant to Rule 60(b)).
Even where the trial court imposed a civil penalty under a statute allowing the trial
court some discretion in the amount that it can fine a defendant,4 it does not seem
that Rule 60(b) can be used by the government to re-open a judgment and reduce the
penalty imposed by the trial court. In such situations the government would be the
prevailing party in the civil proceeding and therefore would not actually be seeking
"relief' from the judgment, which by definition was in its favor. Moreover, it is
questionable whether the desire to prosecute the defendant criminally is a sufficient
justification to alter the final judgment, especially in light of the Double Jeopardy
Clause's interest in preserving the finality of judgments. 4'
135. United States v. Cato Bros., 273 F.2d 153, 156 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 927
(1960).
136. United States v. Brown, 274 F.2d 107, 110 (4th Cir. 1960).
137. Cato Bros., 273 F.2d at 156-57. Although both Cato Brothers and Brown involved an attempt
by a defendant to alter ajudgment, the underlying rationale of those decisions applies equally to motions
filed by the government under the residuary provision of Rule 60(b). See supra notes 135-36 and
accompanying text. If a trial court lacks the power to substitute its judgment as to the appropriate
sanction for that of Congress when a defendant moves to alter the judgment, it certainly cannot have that
power when it is the government that does so.
138. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989).
139. Id. at 452.
140. For example, the current version of the civil False Claims Act provides for a civil penalty of
"not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000" in addition to three times the amount of damages
sustained by the government because of the defendant's act and "the costs of a civil action brought to
recover any such penalty o. damages." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
141. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978);
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More than one-half of the states have a statute or rule identical in all material
respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),'42 which presumably would not
allow a state prosecutor to re-open a state court judgment in order to remove any
double jeopardy bar to a criminal prosecution based upon the same conduct. Even
in states without a statute or rule substantially similar to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b), the applicable statute or rule of court still may not authorize the
government to re-open a civil judgment for the purpose of having the sanction
imposed upon a defendant reduced to level that does not constitute "punishment" for
double jeopardy purposes. For example, in Illinois, a statute allows a trial court, upon
petition, to grant relief from a final judgment within two years after entry of that
judgment.43 Aside from the time limitation, which could in some cases preclude
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); United States v. Jon, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality
opinion).
142. Ala. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(c); Colo. R. Civ. P. 60(b);
Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60(b); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b); Idaho R. Civ. P. 60(b); Ind. R.T.P. 60(B); Kan.
R. Civ. P. 60-260(b); Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Mich. Ct. R. 2.612(C); Minn. R. Civ.
P. 60.02; Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b); N.J. Civ. Prac. R. 4:50-1; N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-060(b); N.D. R. Civ. P.
60(b); Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(b); R.I. R. Civ. P. 60(b); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-60(b) (1984);
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02; Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b); Vt. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60(b); W.
Va. R. Civ. P. 60(b); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 806.07 (1977); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
143. 735 ILL. COMPILED STAT. § 5/2-1401 (1993). The statute provides:
Relief from judgments. (a) Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days from
the entry thereof, may be had upon petition as provided in this Section. Writs of error
coram nobis and coram vobis, bills of review and bills in the nature of bills of review are
abolished. All relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds for such relief heretofore
available, whether by any of the foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be available in
every case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the nature of the order or judgment
from which relief is sought or of the proceedings in which it was entered. There shall be
no distinction between actions and other proceedings, statutory or otherwise, as to
availability of relief, grounds for relief or the relief obtainable.
(b) The petition must be filed in the same proceeding in which the order or judgment
was entered but is not a continuation thereof. The petition must be supported by affidavit
or other appropriate showing as to matters not of record. All parties to the petition shall
be notified as provided by rule.
(c) The petition must be filed not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or
judgment. Time during which the person seeking relief is under legal disability or duress
or the ground for relief is fraudulently concealed shall be excluded in computing the
period of 2 years.
(d) The filing of a petition under this Section does not affect the order or judgment,
or suspend its operation.
(e) Unless lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears from the record proper, the
vacation or modification of an order or judgment pursuant to the provisions of this Section
does not affect the right, title or interest in or to any real or personal property of any
person, not a party to the original action, acquired for value after the entry of the order
or judgment but before the filing of the petition, nor affect any right of any person not a
party to the original action under any certificate of sale issued before the filing of the
petition, pursuant to a sale based on the order or judgment.
(f) Nothing contained in this Section affects any existing right to relief from a void
order or judgment, or to employ any existing method to procure that relief.
1993]
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the government from seeking to modify the judgment, it once again is questionable
whether the government, as the prevailing party, would be seeking "relief' from the
judgment.
It therefore seems that in most cases the government will be unable to remove a
double jeopardy bar to a second "punishment" for the same offense by returning,
before the criminal trial, to the tribunal that imposed the civil sanction and having
that sanction reduced to a level that does not constitute "punishment" for purposes
of double jeopardy analysis. If in a particular case the government is not precluded
from having the initiad civil sanction modified, that course clearly is preferable -
from both the standpoint of the government and the standpoint of society - to
dismissing the criminal prosecution based upon the same conduct that led to the civil
sanction.
If, however, the government cannot have the civil sanction modified before the
criminal trial, is there any way of avoiding imposition of a second punishment other
than by dismissing the criminal prosecution? If the sanction imposed in the civil
proceeding was a fine, one possibility is to allow the criminal prosecution to proceed,
but, in the event of a conviction, preclude the trial court from imposing a fine upon
the defendant."M Although this would allow the defendant to avoid paying two
"fines," it would not avoid two "punishments," because a term of incarceration, even
without the imposition of a fine, still would constitute "punishment." And, because
it would be a second punishment for the same offense, it would be prohibited by the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
Nevertheless, a variation of this proposal has some appeal as the means for dealing
with the problem. Because the initial proceeding against the criminal defendant was,
by definition, a civil proceeding, she has not yet been subjected to a criminal trial.
Indeed, she had not even been placed in 'jeopardy" within the meaning of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. '45 The double jeopardy provision therefore does not bar the
government from prosecuting (as opposed to punishing) the defendant, and a trial
court should deny a motion to dismiss the charges against the defendant on double
jeopardy grounds and allow the criminal action to proceed." If the criminal
144. See Mullett v. Miller, 816 P.2d 251, 255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting the prosecution's
argument to this effect), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23. In a criminal prosecution, jeopardy attaches when
the accused is "put to trial before the trier of facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge." Serfass v.
United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975) (quoting Jorn, 400 U.S. at 479 (plurality opinion)). In a jury
trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and swom. Crist, 437 U.S. at 35, 38; United States
v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977). In a bench trial, jeopardy attaches when the
judge begins to hear eviderce, Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 27 (1977); Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. at 569, which has been taken to mean when the first witness is sworn. Crist, 437 U.S. at 32-33.
In cases in which the defer dant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, jeopardy attaches when the
court accepts the plea. United States v. Baggett, 901 F.2d 1546, 1548 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
865 (1990); Smith v. State, 559 So. 2d 1281, 1283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). But see United States v.
Combs, 634 F.2d 1295, 1298 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that jeopardy attaches at the imposition of
sentence and formal pronotncement or entry of judgment upon a plea of guilty), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
913 (1981).
146. Cf. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1984) (holding that a defendant who, over the
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prosecution results in a verdict or finding of not guilty, no double jeopardy problem
arises: the defendant was subjected to only one criminal trial for her conduct; she
was not prosecuted a second time for the same offense after an acquittal, after a
conviction, or even after the premature termination of a criminal trial; and she was
not punished twice for the same offense.
On the other hand, if the government succeeds in its criminal prosecution of the
-defendant, the Double Jeopardy Clause, as interpreted in Halper, clearly bars the
imposition of any punishment upon the defendant (unless of course the government
at this point can return to the tribunal that imposed the civil sanction and have it
reduced to a level that would not constitute "punishment" for purposes of double
jeopardy analysis). Nevertheless, this result - despite its shortcomings - will in
most cases be preferable to having the charges against the defendant dismissed before
trial. Although the government will not be able to impose a term of incarceration or
prosecutor's objection, pleaded guilty to two lesser included offenses could be tried for the greater
inclusive offenses, and, if convicted, trial court would have to confront the question of multiple
punishments as a matter of state law); United States v. Marcus Schloss & Co., 724 F. Supp. 1123, 1124
n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that the trial court reserved a decision on the defendant's pretrial motion to
dismiss several counts of an indictment pending the outcome of the trial). Despite the Supreme Court's
holding in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), an order denying such a pretrial motion to
dismiss an indictment would not be immediately appealable in those jurisdictions in which a defendant
can appeal only a "final decision." In Abney, the Court held that "pretrial orders rejecting claims of
former jeopardy ... constitute 'final decisions' and thus satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of [28
U.S.C.] § 1291." Id. at 652 (footnote omitted). Abney, however, involved a claim by the defendants that
they previously had been tried and acquitted for the same offense, a claim contesting the very power of
the government to bring them to trial. As the Abney Court correctly recognized, the defendants'
protection against double jeopardy would be significantly impaired if review were deferred until after
their trial.
[T]his Court has long recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects an individual
against more than being subjected to double punishments. It is a guarantee against being
twice put to trial for the same offense .... It thus protects interests wholly unrelated to
the propriety of any subsequent conviction. . . . Obviously, [this] aspectf of the
guarantee's protections would be lost if the accused were forced to "run the gauntlet" a
second time before an appeal could be taken; even if the accused is acquitted, or, if
convicted, has his conviction ultimately reversed on double jeopardy grounds, he has still
been forced to endure a trial that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to prohibit.
Consequently, if a criminal defendant is to avoid exposure to double jeopardy and thereby
enjoy the full protection of the Clause, his double jeopardy challenge to the indictment
must be reviewable before that subsequent exposure occurs.
Id. at 660-62 (footnotes omitted). The Court's reasoning in Abney is inapplicable, though, when a
defendant merely claims that she already has been punished (but not tried criminally) for the same
conduct on which the criminal charges are based. In these circumstances the Double Jeopardy Clause's
protection against multiple punishments - the only protection at issue - "can be fully vindicated on
an appeal following final judgment," id. at 660, by vacating any sentence imposed by the trial court in
violation of that Clause. Courts that have reached the contrary result, United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d
839, 842 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Woods, 949 F.2d 175, 176 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1562 (1992); United States v. Reed, 937 F.2d 575, 576 n.1 (lth Cir. 1991); see
also Purcell v. United States, 594 A.2d 527,528 n.1 (D.C. 1991), have assumed that the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars a criminal trial of a defendant who previously has been "punished" in a separate civil
proceeding based upon the same conduct.
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a fine upon the defendant, it will have obtained a criminal conviction of the
defendant, as allowed by Halper, with all the collateral consequences such a
conviction entails. In addition to labelling the defendant a "criminal," she may, as a
convicted felon, be precluded, for example, from votingfrom obtaining a license to
engage in a particulkx profession or occupation, and from lawfully possessing
firearms. The criminad prosecution therefore should not be viewed as an empty
gesture merely because it might not result in any punishment being imposed upon the
defendant by the trial court. Nor should it be viewed as the government's vindictively
forcing the defendant to undergo the trauma and expense of defending himself in a
meaningless criminal trial.
VI. Tax Upon the Unlawful Possession of Marijuana
and Other Controlled Substances
Since the mid-1980s, more than half the states have enacted statutes imposing
taxes upon those who unlawfully possess or deal in marijuana or other controlled
substances. 47 These statutes typically make one who fails to pay the drug tax owed
subject to an additiond monetary penalty,"4 and make the failure to comply with
the provisions of the statute a criminal offense. 49 The Montana Dangerous Drug
Tax Act," for example, imposes upon every person unlawfully possessing or
storing dangerous drugs a tax equal to the greater of either 10% of the market value
147. ALA. CODE §§ 40-17A-1 to -16 (1993); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-1201, -1202, -1203.01, -
1204, -1212.02 (1991 & Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 39-28.7-101 to -109 (West 1990 & Supp.
1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-650 to -660 (Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §212.0505 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-15-1 to -11 (1993) (excise tax upon each use, possession,
consumption, storage, or transfer); IDAHO CODE §§ 63-4201 to -4211 (Supp. 1993); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§§ 520/1 to /26 (1992); IND, CODE ANN. §§ 6-7-3-1 to -17 (Bums Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
453B.1 to .15 (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-5201 to -5211 (1989 & Supp. 1992); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:2601 to :2610 (West Supp. 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 4433-4436
(West 1990 & Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 297D.01 to .14 (West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
15-25-101 to -123 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 77-4301 to -4316 (1990); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
372A.010 to .150 (Michie Sapp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-18A-1 to -7 (Michie 1993); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 105-113.105 to .113 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 57-36.1-01 to -16 (1993); 68 OKLA. STAT.
§§-450.1-.9 (Supp. 1992); RI. GEN. LAws §§ 44-49-1 to -16 (Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 10-50A-1 to -15 (1932) (repealed by 1987 S.D. Laws ch. 111, §§ 1-15 after being declared
unconstitutional in State v. Roberts, 384 N.W.2d 688 (S.D. 1986)); TEx. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 159.001
to .301 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-19-101 to -107 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 139.87 to .96
(West Supp. 1992).
148. E.g., ALA. CODE § 40-17A-9(a) (1993) (100% of tax); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-660(a) (West
Supp. 1993) (100% of tax); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 520/10 (1992) (four times amount of tax); IND. CODE
ANN. § 6-7-3-1I(a) (Bums Supp. 1993) (100% of tax); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297D.09 (West 1991) (100%
of tax); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-113(2) (1993) (10% of tax); 68 OKLA. STAT. § 450.8 (1992) (100%
of tax); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 139.95(1) (West Supp. 1992) (100% of tax).
149. E.g., ALA CODE § 40-17A-9(a) (1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-660(b) (Supp. 1993); 35 ILL.
COMp. STAT. § 520/10 (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-7-3-1 l(b) (Bums Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 297D.09 (West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-113(2) (1993); 68 OKLA. STAT. § 450.8 (1992);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 139.95(2) (West Supp. 1992).
150. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1993).
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of the drugs or, inter alia, $100 per ounce of marijuana, $250 per ounce of
hashish, and $200 per gram of various other controlled substances." It also
makes one who fails to pay the tax subject to a penalty of 10% of the amount of
the tax and provides that the purposeful or knowing failure to pay the tax, with
the intent to evade the tax, is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $1000
or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both." Similarly, the Illinois
Cannabis and Controlled Substances Tax Act imposes upon any "dealer" who
possesses cannabis or controlled substances a tax of $5 per gram of cannabis,
$250 per gram of controlled substance that is sold by weight, and $2000 on each
fifty dosage units of a controlled substance that is not sold by weight.' The
Act defines a "dealer" as a person who illegally manufactures, produces, ships,
transports, imports, sells or transfers, or possesses with intent to deliver to another
person more than a specified amount of cannabis or controlled substance.'5 It
151. The Montana statute provides:
Tax on dangerous drugs. (1) There is a tax on the possession and storage of dangerous
drugs. Except as provided in [MONT. CODE ANN. §] 15-25-122 [exempting individuals
authorized by state or federal law to possess or store dangerous drugs], each person
possessing or storing dangerous drugs is liable for the tax. The tax imposed is determined
pursuant to subsection (2). The tax is due and payable on the date of assessment. The
department shall add an administration fee of 5% of the tax imposed pursuant to
subsection (2) to offset costs incurred in assessing value, in collecting the tax, and in any
review and appeal process.
(2) With the exception that the tax on possession and storage of less than 1 ounce, 1
gram, or 100 micrograms of dangerous drugs must be that set forth below for 1 ounce,
I gram, or 100 micrograms, the tax on possession and storage of dangerous drugs is the
greater of:
(a) 10% of the assessed market value of the drugs, as determined by the department
[of revenue]; or
(b)(i) $100 per ounce of marijuana . . . or its derivatives, as determined by the
aggregate weight of the substance seized;
(ii) $250 per ounce of hashish . . ., as determined by the aggregate weight of the
substance seized;
(iii) $200 per gram of any substance containing or purported to contain any amount
of a dangerous drug included in Schedule I pursuant to [MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-
222(1), (2), (4), and (5), or Schedule II pursuant to [MONT. CODE ANN. §] 50-32-224(1)
through (4), as determined by the aggregate weight of the substance seized;
(iv) $10 per 100 micrograms of any substance containing or purported to contain any
amount of lysergic acid diethylainide (LSD) included in Schedule I pursuant to [MONT.
CODE ANN. §] 50-32-222(3), as determined by the aggregate weight of the substance
seized;
(v) $100 per ounce of any substance containing or purported to contain any amount
of an immediate precursor as defined under Schedule II pursuant to [MONT. CODE ANN.
§] 50-32-224(5), as determined by the aggregate weight of the substance seized; and
(vi) $100 per gram of any substance containing or purported to contain any amount of
dangerous drug not otherwise provided for in this subsection (2).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-111(1)-(2) (1993).
152. Id. § 15-25-113(2) (incorporating the provisions of §§ 15-53-111 and 15-30-321(3)).
153. 35 ILL. ComP. STAT. §§ 52011 to /26 (1993).
154. Id. § 520/9.
155. Id. § 520/2.
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also provides that a dealer who violates the Act is subject to a penalty of four
times the amount of the tax and that a dealer who possesses or distributes
cannabis or a controlled substance without affixing the stamps indicating payment
of the tax is guilty of a Class 4 felony." Statutes such as these raise the
question of whether a tax on the unlawful possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. If so, then, under Halper,
a state cannot convict and punish an individual for the unlawful possession of
marijuana or other controlled substances and also assess a tax against her for
possession of those same drugs.
Courts that have considered this question have reached conflicting results. In
Sorensen v. Department of Revenue,' the Montana Department of Revenue had
assessed a tax of $4216 on one individual for his possession of 21.08 grams of
cocaine ($200 per gram), after he had been convicted and sentenced for criminal
possession of the same cocaine. Furthermore, the Department had assessed a tax
of $1260 on another individual for his possession of 12.6 ounces of marijuana
($100 per ounce), after he had been convicted and sentenced for criminal
possession of the same marijuana. The Supreme Court of Montana held that
neither assessment constituted a second punishment for possession of the
dangerous drugs in question and therefore did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 5 The court initially found that the dangerous
drug tax is not a criminal penalty, but rather an excise tax designed to raise
revenue." 9 It then rejected the argument that the tax imposes a second punish-
ment under Halper, apparently finding Halper inapplicable for a number of
reasons."6 First, it concluded that Halper, by its language, applies only to
statutory provisions imposing a fixed penalty for each offense regardless of the
actual costs and damage incurred by the government, while the Montana
dangerous drug tax 'is an excise tax based on the quantity of drugs in the
taxpayer's possession."16" Second, the court concluded that, unlike the civil
sanction in Halper, "a tax requires no proof of remedial costs on the part of the
state."' Finally, the court concluded that the tax is not excessive, because "[iut
is neither a fixed penalty as in Halper, nor is the amount of the tax so grossly
disproportionate as tc transform this tax into a criminal penalty which violates
double jeopardy."'' The court noted that the "rates of tax on various drugs are
comparable to those in other states and also comparable to the amounts in effect
for many years during the effective period of the Federal Drug Tax Act . 14
156. Id § 520/10.
157. 836 P.2d 29 (Mont. 1992). The title of the case in the Pacific Reporter spells one respondent's
name Sorensen, but in the text of the opinion the respondent's name is spelled Sorenson.
158. l. at 33.
159. Id. at 31-32.
160. The court's reasoning on this issue is far from clear.
161. Sorensen, 836 P.2d at 33.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. After finding the dangerous drug tax does not constitute a multiple punishment and does
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In In re Kurth Ranch,'" on the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite result with respect to a tax of $208,105
assessed by the Montana Department of Revenue on several members of an
extended family who subsequently were convicted and sentenced for charges
relating to the criminal possession and sale of the same dangerous drugs upon
which the tax was levied.'" The court read Halper as requiring "a rational
relationship between the sanction imposed and the damages suffered by the
government,"'67 but noted that the Department of Revenue, despite opportunities
to do so, "refused to make any showing regarding the costs incurred in eradicating
dangerous drugs and their effects."'" It concluded that allowing the state to
impose the tax, without its showing even a rough approximation of its actual
damages and costs, would be sanctioning an impermissible second punishment for
the possession of the drugs."
Neither of these opinions, however, adequately addresses the relevant issue.' 0
not violate the double jeopardy provision, the court held that the tax act is not unconstitutional on its
face. It stated: "Tihe tax is not a criminal penalty and does not rest on a criminal conviction. Further,
under the Halper analysis the tax does not serve the goals of punishment. Neither is the tax excessive
or grossly disproportionate to the harm suffered by the government." Id.
165. 986 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993).
166. The initial assessment by the Department of Revenue totaled nearly $865,000 for the possession
of 2155 marijuana plants, 1811 ounces of harvested marijuana, and several gallons of hash tar and hash
oil. The Kurths administratively challenged both the method of computation and the legality of the
assessment, but before the challenge was resolved, they all pleaded guilty to criminal charges and
received individual sentences. The Kurths then filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and the
Department of Revenue filed an amended proof of claim with the bankruptcy court, which both the
Kurths and the trustee in bankruptcy challenged. The bankruptcy court eventually denied the Department
of Revenue's claim, concluding that the taxes on the marijuana plants, hash tar, and hash oil were
arbitrary, capricious, and violative of the drug tax statute, and that the remaining $208,105 tax on the
harvested marijuana constituted a second punishment for possession of the marijuana, in violation of the
double jeopardy provision. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990). The district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's order, In re Kurth Ranch, No. CV-90-084-GF, 1991 WL 365065 (D.
Mont. Apr. 23, 1991), and the Department of Revenue appealed only the determination that the $208,105
tax on the harvested marijuana was unconstitutional.
167. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d at 1311.
168. Id. at 1312. The court saw "no reason to question the district court's refusal to 'take judicial
notice' of drug abuse's general costs to society," id., at least in the absence of even a "rough" showing
by the govemment of its actual costs in the case, id.
169. Id.
170. At least two other courts have been faced with the issue, but neither of them adequately dealt
with it. In Rehg v. Illinois Dep't of Revenue, 605 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1992), the plaintiff, who previously
had been convicted and sentenced for the manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance, contended
that the $42,000 tax assessed against him under the Illinois Cannabis and Controlled Substances Tax Act,
35 ILL. CoMP. STAT. §§ 520/1 to 126 (1992), for possession of the same controlled substance, plus a
penalty of $168,000 (four times the unpaid tax), and interest of $3675, for a total liability of $213,675,
did not bear a rational relationship to the damages suffered by the state and therefore constituted a second
punishment under Halper. Agreeing with the plaintiff's formulation of the issue, the court apparently
concluded that the drug tax itself did not constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes because
"the plaintiffs failure to pay the tax resulted in a loss to the State of $42,000 in tax revenue." Rehg, 605
N.E.2d at 536. However, even under the plaintiffs (and the court's) formulation of the issue, the court's
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Under Halper, the critical question is whether the drug tax solely serves a
remedial or other nonpunitive purpose, or whether, on the other hand, it also
serves retributive or deterrent purposes, in which case it would constitute
"punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis."'
One of the articulated purposes of a tax on the possession of marijuana and
other controlled substances is to generate revenue to fund investigative efforts
directed toward the identification, arrest, and prosecution of individuals engaged
in illegal drug activities," and "to compensate the State for costs incurred as
reasoning entirely misses the point. Whenever the government assesses a drug tax upon one who
unlawfully possessed controlled substances, it can be concluded that the unpaid tax resulted in the loss
of tax revenue to the state. But this conclusion does not answer what should be the relevant question
under the plaintiffs (and the court's) reading of Halper- whether the so-called tax serves to reimburse
the government for the costs it incurred because of the "taxpayer's" illegal drug activity, or whether,
instead, it is punitive in nature. More importantly, though, the Rehg court's analysis does not answer
what should be the relevant question under a proper reading of Halper, namely, does the drug tax, even
in part, serve to punish the "taxpayer" for her possession of controlled substances. See infra text
accompanying note 171. The Rehig court's apparent conclusion that the tax assessment reimbursed the
state for its lost tax revenue assumes that the sole purpose of the so-called tax is to raise revenue and
not to punish the "dealer" for her possession of the controlled substances. The court in Rehig did,
however, conclude that the $168,000 penalty imposed for nonpayment of the drug tax appeared excessive
in relation to the costs the state generally would incur in investigating and prosecuting individuals for
failing to comply with the drug tax statute and that it therefore might constitute a second punishment for
double jeopardy purposes. hi. at 536-38. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the trial court to
allow the state to present evidence of its actual costs arising from the plaintiffs failure to comply with
the Act. Id. at 538-39. Nevertheless, because the conduct for which the plaintiff was criminally punished
(manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance) was different from that which was the subject of the
civil sanction (failure to pay a tax on the controlled substance)," one must ask - as the Rehg court did
not - whether the civil sanction was imposed for the "same offense" as the punishment imposed in the
criminal proceeding. If it was not, the Double Jeopardy Clause would be inapplicable, regardless of
whether a rational relationship existed between the civil sanction and the costs incurred by the state in-
investigating and prosecuting individuals for failing to comply with the drug tax statute.
In Rosenow v. Commissicner of Revenue, No. 5236, 1991 WL 227915 (Minn. Tax Ct. Oct. 15, 1991),
an individual who previously had pleaded guilty to (and presumably was sentenced for) criminal charges
arising out of his possession of marijuana challenged the assessment upon him of a tax of $4732 for
possession of the same marijuana plus a nonpayment penalty of the same amount. Id. at *3. The court,
without discussing the issue, apparently assumed that the tax itself did not constitute "punishment" for
double jeopardy purposes, for it focused only upon the relationship between the nonpayment penalty and
the unpaid tax, stating that "[the only question is whether the penalty of l-to-I constitutes an
overwhelmingly disproportionate sanction similar to the 8-to-I sanction prohibited in Halper." Id. at *4.
The court concluded that "the 1-to-I penalty for failure to pay the tax on time is a reasonable penalty
that is rationally related to the state's loss of revenue caused by the taxpayer's failure to pay the tax and
is remedial in nature." Id. Once again, as in Rehg, the court did not address the relevant issue.
171. United States v. Hlper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989); accord Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
2801, 2810 n.12, 2812 (1993).
172. See Sorensen v. Department of Revenue, 836 P.2d 29, 31 (Mont. 1992) (quoting preamble to
1987 Mont. Laws ch. 563); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-122 (1993) (one-third of tax to be distributed
to law enforcement agency that seized the drugs taxed, to be used to enforce drug laws). Some drug tax
statutes specifically provide that a portion of the proceeds of the tax shall go to specific law enforcement
agencies. ARItz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-104(B)(2)(b) (Supp. 1993) (95% of moneys collected credited
to anti-racketeering revolving fund for benefit of agencies responsible for seizure of the drugs taxed);
IND. CODE ANN. § 6-7-3-16 (Bums Supp. 1993) (30% of total amount collected from an assessment to
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a consequence of illegal drug manufacture and use."'" Raising revenue to detect
and prosecute those individuals engaged in illegal drug activity and compensating
the state for the damages directly caused by a particular individual's illegal drug
activity clearly constitutes a remedial purpose. Such a purpose, however, is
precisely the same as the purpose intended to be served by the civil sanction
involved in Halper. If this were the only purpose of a tax on the unlawful
possession of drugs, the Kurth Ranch court would have been correct when it held
that, under Halper, the state must show that the amount of the "tax" in any given
case is rationally related to the actual costs and damages suffered by it as a result
of the particular individual's illegal drug activity. For, as that court stated, a state
should not be allowed to evade the prohibitions of the Double Jeopardy Clause
merely by labeling the assessment a "tax" instead of a "fine" or "penalty.""7
Revenue generated by a tax on the unlawful possession of dangerous drugs,
however, is used for purposes other than merely compensating the state for the
direct costs it incurred because of a particular individual's illegal conduct. Such
revenue may be used to pay for government services in general,"5 or it may be
used to fund programs and services to combat or deal with the consequences of
illegal drug use.'76 In discussing the Illinois Cannabis and Controlled Substances
Tax Act,'" the Supreme Court of Illinois stated:
law enforcement agency that provided information that resulted in the assessment, to be used to conduct
criminal investigations); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.113 (1992) (75% of amount collected from an
assessment to law enforcement agency that conducted investigation of dealer that led to the assessment);
see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-5211 (Supp. 1992) (50% of all moneys received from collection of
assessments of delinquent taxes and penalties to be used for law enforcement and criminal prosecution
purposes).
173. Rehg, 605 N.E.2d at 531.
174. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d at 1310.
175. Some drug tax statutes specifically provide that the proceeds of the tax, or a portion thereof,
shall be credited to the state's general fund. ALA. CODE § 40-17A-15 (1993) (all proceeds after payment
of expenses of administration and enforcement of drug tax); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1204(B)(2)(a)
(Supp. 1993) (5% of moneys collected); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-5211 (Supp. 1992) (all moneys received
from collection of taxes and 50% of all moneys collected from assessments of delinquent taxes and
penalties imposed thereunder); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.113 (1992) (25% of amount collected).
176. Some drug tax statutes specifically earmark the proceeds of the tax, or a portion thereof, for
special purposes. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.0505 (West Supp. 1992) (creating "Drug Abuse Education
Trust Fund," to be administered at discretion of legislature, and "Drug Enforcement Trust Fund," to be
administered by Department of Revenue); IDAHO CODE § 63-4209 (Supp. 1993) (to be used for substance
abuse treatment); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-7-3-16 (Bums Supp. 1993) (10% of amount deposited each month
to law enforcement training board to train law enforcement personnel; other funds to drug free
communities fund to be used to promote alcohol and drug abuse prevention); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
47:2609 (Vest Supp. 1993) (to Drug Treatment Fund to be used to fund drug treatment and rehabilitation
programs); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-122 (1993) (one-third of tax to department of family services to
be used for youth evaluation program and chemical abuse aftercare programs and one-third to department
of justice to be used for grants to youth courts to fund chemical abuse assessments and for grants to
counties to fund services for detention of juvenile offenders in facilities separate from adult jails); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 77-4310.01 (1990) (to County Drug Law Enforcement and Education Funds and to
Nebraska State Patrol Drug Control and Education Cash Fund).
177. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 520/1 to /26 (1992).
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[T]he legislature's desire [is] to require those who profit from illegal
drug use to reimburse the State for the costs of remedying the societal
ills that stem from drug use. Those costs include not only increased
law enforcement expense resulting from drug-related violence, but
also the severe collateral consequences of drug traffic, such as drug
addiction, lost productivity, greater health costs and more demands on
public assistance. The tax also provides an additional source of
revenue to help offset the costs of drug education and to provide
reparation to victims of drug-related crime.'
Where the funds generated by an assessment on the unlawful possession of
dangerous drugs are used to pay for government services in general, or even for
a wide array of government programs and services dealing with the consequences
of drug abuse, that assessment can properly be characterized as a "tax," rather
than a "fine" or "penalty." If the only purpose of a drug tax were to generate
revenue for these purposes, Halper would be inapplicable, and the tax would not
constitute "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. This is true
regardless of whether the state could show a rational relationship between the
amount of the tax in z particular case and the government's expenditures on the
specific programs and services funded by the tax.'
A fair analysis of the drug tax statutes, however, leads to the conclusion that
a tax on the possession of marijuana and other controlled substances should be
deemed "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. As several courts
have recognized, such a tax "seeks to punish and deter those in possession of
illegal drugs."'t" The retributive purpose of the tax is evidenced by the fact that
it is intimately tied to criminal activity on the part of the "taxpayer," applying
only to behavior that already is a crime, namely, the unlawful possession of, or
trafficking in, dangerous drugs."' As in Austin v. United States," where the
178. Rehg, 605 N.E.2d at 531.
179. In this context, the Sorensen court's statement that "a tax requires no proof of remedial costs
on the part of the state" would be correct. Sorensen, 836 P.2d at 31.
180. Sims v. Collection Div. of State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6, 13 (Utah 1992); accord 1n re Kurth
Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 75-76 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (stating that "the Montana Act promotes the
traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence"), affd, 1991 WL 365065 (D. Mont. April
23, 1991), affid, 986 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993); Rehg, 605 N.E.2d at 531
(stating that "the tax imposed by the Act tends to punish or deter those who possess or sell illegal
drugs"); Sorensen, 836 P.2d at 34 (Hunt, J., dissenting) ("[T]he purpose and effect of the [Montana Drug
Tax Act] is ... punishment and deterrence."); see also State v. Durrant, 769 P.2d 1174, 1181 (Kan.
1989) ("[T]he State concede; in its brief that the primary purpose of [the Kansas drug tax act] is to
discourage or eliminate drug dealing."); State v. Roberts, 384 N.W.2d 688, 691 (S.D. 1986) ("[Ihe clear
intent of [the statute imposing a luxury tax on controlled substances and marijuana] is to provide an extra
penalty on possessors of controlled substances"); Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 856 (Utah
1992) ("The legislative history of the Stamp Act reveals two objectives, namely, to raise revenue and to
discourage illegal drug trafficking."); Sims, 841 P.2d at 15 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) ("The
primary purpose of [the] Act is to penalize, not to raise revenue. In effect, the Act imposes criminal
penalties for the possession c f illegal drugs.").
181. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. at 76; Rehg, 605 N.E.2d at 531; Sims, 841 P.2d at 14; see also
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Supreme Court recently held that in rem forfeitures of conveyances and real
property under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970 are punitive in nature and therefore subject to the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment," 4 the tax is "tie[d] ... directly to the commission of
drug offenses,"'' 5 and "focus[es] ... on the culpability of the owner,"'" thereby
revealing a legislative intent "to punish .. . those involved in [illegal] drug
[activity]."' '
The deterrent purpose of the tax is evident in the tax rates, which under all of the
drug tax statutes are quite high."= By imposing a significant tax on the unlawful
possession of dangerous drugs, state legislatures clearly intend to deter the illegal
possession of, and trafficking in, dangerous drugs by making such possession and
trafficking costly and by "diminish[ing the] economic rewards associated with drug
trafficking.""'
Moreover, in many of the drug tax statutes, the penalty provision also supports
the conclusion that one of the objectives of the tax is to punish and deter those
unlawfully in possession of dangerous drugs."9 More than one-half of the drug tax
statutes impose a penalty equal to 100% of the tax owed (in addition to the base
tax) upon those who fail to pay the required drug tax.'' Indeed, one state imposes
Roberts, 384 N.W.2d at 691 ("[IThe clear intent of [the statute imposing a luxury tax on controlled
substances and marijuana] is to provide an extra penalty on possessors of controlled substances"); Sims,
841 P.2d at 15 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) ("The primary purpose of [the Utah Illegal Drug
Stamp Tax] Act is to penalize, not to raise revenue. In effect, the Act imposes criminal penalties for the
possession of illegal drugs.").
182. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
183. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) (1988).
184. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONSr. amend. VIII.
185. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. E.g., ALA. CODE § 40-17A-8 (1993) ($3.50 per gram of marijuana, $200 per gram of controlled
substance sold by weight, and $2000 on each fifty dosage units of a controlled substance not sold by
weight); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-28.7-102 (West 1990) ($100 per ounce of marijuana and $1000 per
ounce of controlled substance); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 520/9 (1992) ($5 per gram of cannabis, $250 per
gram of controlled substance sold by weight, and $2000 on each fifty dosage units of a controlled
substance not sold by weight); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-111(2) (1991) (greater of 10% of market
value of the drugs or, inter alia, $100 per ounce of marijuana, $250 per ounce of hashish, and $200 per
gram of various other controlled substances).
189. Rehg, 605 N.E.2d at 531; see also In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. at 76 (stating that "the tax will
promote elimination of illegal drug traffic"); Durrant, 769 P.2d at 1181 ("Mhe State concedes in its brief
that the primary purpose of [the Kansas drug tax act] is to discourage or eliminate drug dealing."); Zissi,
842 P.2d at 856 ("The legislative history of the [Illegal Drug] Stamp [Tax] Act reveals two objectives,
namely, to raise revenue and to discourage illegal drug trafficking.").
190. It is, of course, highly unlikely that an individual who unlawfully possesses dangerous drugs
will in fact pay the required tax, so virtually all of those liable for the tax also will be liable for the
penalty for not paying of the tax. Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider both the tax and the
applicable nonpayment penalty when determining whether the tax constitutes "punishment" under Halper.
191. ALA. CODE § 40-17A-9(a) (1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-660(a) (Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE
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a nonpayment penalty of three times the amount of tax owed," and another
imposes a penalty of four times the tax owed.93 Tax penalties of 100% or more
are far too onerous to justify the conclusion that the sole objective of the drug tax
is to raise revenue."9
Although state legislatures may not be forthright in expressing the true purposes
of a tax on the unlawful possession of dangerous drugs, 95 they undoubtedly intend
to achieve the goals of retribution and deterrence. One should not conclude that the
purposes of such a tax do not include these goals merely because the legislature
conceals its true intent when enacting the tax. Moreover, while it is true that the
Supreme Court "[i]n I-Jalper... focused on whether 'the sanction as applied in the
individual case serves the goals of punishment,""' it makes sense in this situation,
as it did in Austin v. United States" with respect to the in rem forfeiture provi-
sions of 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), to focus on the drug tax statute as a
whole. For, unlike Hafper, which "involved a small, fixed-penalty provision, which
'in the ordinary case ... can be said to do no more than make the Government
whole,"""5 the tax imposed by a drug tax statute is sizable'" and "any relation-
ship between the Government's actual costs and the amount of the [tax would
appear to be] merely coincidental."'
In sum, because a tax on the unlawful possession of dangerous drugs is intended,
at least in part, to serve retributive and deterrent purposes, it must be deemed
"punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. The fact that the legislature
may have chosen to achieve retribution and deterrence by what it terms a "tax" and
a "penalty" should not change the result."' Consequently, under Halper, a state
§ 63-4207(1) (Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-7-3-11(a) (Bums Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. §
453B.12 (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-5208 (1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:2607 (West
Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. AN. § 297D.09 (West 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-4309 (1990); NEV. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 372A.070 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.110A (1992); N.D. CFNT.
CODE § 57-36.1-09 (1993);. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 450.8 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-49-10(1) (Supp.
1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-19-106(1) (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 139.95(1) (West Supp 1992).
192. COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-28.7-107 (West Supp. 1993).
193. 35 IL.. COMP. ST.AT. § 520/10 (1992).
194. Sims, 841 P.2d at 13-14. This is not to say, however, that a drug tax imposed by a statute that
contains a nonpayment penalty of less than 100% of the amount of tax due, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §
15-25-113(2) (1991) (incorporating the provisions of § 15-53-111, which imposes a nonpayment penalty
of 10% of the tax owed); Tax. TAX CODE ANN. § 159.101(g) (West 1992) (nonpayment penalty of 10%
of tax owed), does not constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. Even without such a stiff
penalty, a drug tax still could be found to serve retributive and deterrent purposes.
195. For example, in § 40-17A-16 of the Alabama Code, the Alabama legislature declared that the
intent of its drug tax statute is "to levy th[e] tax upon illegal drugs in an effort to compensate for the lost
revenue from a section of tha economy that has not heretofore borne its fair share of the tax burden."
ALA. CODE § 40-17A-16 (1593).
196. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 n.14 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448).
197. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
198. Id. at 2812 n.14.
199. See supra note 18F.
200. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 n.14.
201. Sims, 841 P.2d at 14.
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should not be allowed to convict and punish an individual for unlawfully possessing
dangerous drugs and, in addition, impose a tax upon her for possessing those same
drugs.
VII. Halper and Nonmonetary Civil Sanctions
The civil sanction imposed in Halper was a fine. This raises the question of
whether Halper applies to other civil penalties, such as the forfeiture of property or
the revocation or suspension of an individual's driver's license or license to engage
in a particular profession or business. While some of the language in the Halper
opinion applies only to a monetary penalty, or at least only to sanctions for which
a monetary value can be readily determined,' the Court's holding in Halper and
its rationale are broader. The Court in Halper held that "under the Double Jeopardy
Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may
not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second
sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or
retribution."' This language in no way indicates that the Court's holding is
limited to monetary sanctions. Indeed, it indicates just the opposite. That is, this
language implies that any civil sanction - whether a monetary penalty or not -
constitutes "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis to the extent it
serves only as a deterrent or retribution. Moreover, the underlying rationale of
Halper - that a sanction imposed to serve punitive purposes must be deemed
"punishment" for double jeopardy purposes regardless of whether it was imposed
in a civil proceeding or a criminal prosecution - leads to the same conclusion,
because that rationale applies equally to monetary and nonmonetary sanctions
alike. 4 Thus, as the Supreme Court recently stated in Austin v. United States,"03
"[any] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose,
but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment" for purposes of Halper and the Double Jeopardy
Clause.'
Of course, when dealing with a nonmonetary penalty, a slightly different test than
that used by the Supreme Court in Halper must be applied. As one court explained:
202. For example, the Supreme Court stated that "it would be difficult if not impossible in many
cases for a court to determine the precise dollar figure at which a civil sanction has accomplished its
remedial purpose of making the Government whole, but beyond which the sanction takes on the quality
of punishment." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989) (emphasis added); see also id. at 450
("We must leave to the trial court the discretion to determine on the basis of... an accounting [of the
Government's damages and costs] the size of the civil sanction the Government may receive without
crossing the line between remedy and punishment.").
203. Id. at 448-49 (emphasis added).
204. See, e.g., Manocchio v. Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Reed, 937 F.2d 575, 577-78 (11th Cir. 1991).
205. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
206. Id. at 2812 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448) (emphasis added by Court); see also id. at 2810 n.12
("Under United States v. Halper,... the question is whether forfeiture serves in part to punish .... ").
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Where the civil sanction at issue is money damages imposed pursuant
to a statutory provision, [as in Halper,] we are to look to the size of the
award to determine whether it is rationally related to the remedial goal
of compensating the government for its loss.
[Where] no damage award has been imposed on [the] defendant, the
Halper test comparing money damages with the government's loss is
inapposite .... Instead, we must look more broadly at "the penalty
imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to
se rv e ."
, '
The remainder of this section will examine how both the holding and rationale
in Halper apply to a variety of different sanctions that have been imposed in civil
proceedings.
A. Civil Forfeiture of Property
In an effort to stein the recent increase in drug-related crime, Congress and
numerous state legislatures have turned to the "ancient practice"' of declaring
property to be forfeited to the government.2 Statutes have been enacted providing
207. Reed, 937 F.2d at 578; accord Manocchio, 961 F.2d at 1542; see alvo In re 1632 N. Santa
Rita, 801 P.2d 432, 435 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) ("lit is only in the Halper-type fact situation that the
government must give an accounting of its damages and costs. Such is not the case here and our inquiry
narrows to the question of whether the forfeiture cannot be fairly characterized as remedial, but only as
a deterrent or retribution."); State v. Clark, 844 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) ("Halper calls
for the characterization of a civil forfeiture statute as punishment only when the statute cannot be fairly
characterized as remedial."); State v. Fonder, 469 N.W.2d 922, 926 & n.4 (Wis. Ct. App.) (finding it
"inappropriate to apply the Halper analysis" to sanctions imposed in prison disciplinary proceedings
because "[tihe factual contexts differ so significantly," but nevertheless finding no double jeopardy bar
to a criminal prosecution based upon the same acts that led to the sanctions, "[blecause punishment was
not the principal purpose of the disciplinary action"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 614 (1991).
208. United States v. McCaslin, 959 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 382 (1992).
209. The Supreme Court discussed the historical background of forfeiture statutes in this country
in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). The Court stated:
At common law the value of an inanimate object directlS, or indirectly causing the
accidental death of a King's subject was forfeited to the Crown as a deodand. The origins
of the deodand are traceable to Biblical and pre-Judeo-Christian practices, which reflected
the view that the instrument of death was accused and that religious expiation was
required. See 0. Holmes, The Common Law, c. 1 (1881). The value of the instrument
was forfeited to the King, in the belief that the King would provide the money for Masses
to be said for the good of the dead man's soul, or insure that the deodand was put to
charitable uses. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *300. When application of the deodand
to religious or eleemosynary purposes ceased, and the deodand became a source of Crown
revenue, the institution was justified as a penalty for carelessness.
Forfeiture also re;ulted at common law from conviction for felonies and treason. The
convicted felon forfeited his chattels to the Crown and his lands escheated to his lord; the
convicted traitor forfeited all of his property, real and personal, to the Crown. See 3 W.
Holdsworth, History of English Law 68-71 (3d ed. 1927); 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland,
History of English Law 351 (2d ed. 1909). The basis for these forfeitures was that a
breach of the criminal law was an offense to the King's peace, which was felt to justify
denial of the right tc own property. See I W. Blackstone, Commentaries *299.
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for the forfeiture of controlled substances as well as currency, real property,
vehicles, and other articles used to facilitate, or that are traceable to, illegal drug
activity."' In addition to forfeitures for drug-related offenses, forfeiture of
property is authorized by federal and state statutes for a vast array of other
violations, such as trafficking in weapons,2" ' failing to report certain currency
transactions,"' and illegally importing fish, wildlife or plants."3
Contemporary forfeiture statutes typically provide for an in rem proceeding
against the article itself, as opposed to making forfeiture an additional penalty that
can be imposed upon a convicted defendant at sentencing. Such in rem forfeiture
proceedings have been held not to be criminal proceedings for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.2 4 However, Halper raises the question of whether the
In addition, English Law provided for statutory forfeiture of offending objects used in
violation of the customs and revenue laws - likely a product of the confluence and
merger of the deodand tradition and the belief that the right to own property could be
denied the wrongdoer. Statutory forfeitures were most often enforced under the in rem
procedure utilized in the Court of Exchequer to forfeit the property of felons. See 3 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *261-262; CJ. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 137-138
(1943).
Deodands did not become part of the common-law tradition of this country. See
Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 188 SAX. 54 (1916). Nor has forfeiture of
estates as a consequence of federal criminal conviction been permitted, see 18 U.S.C. §
3563; Rev. Stat. § 5326 (1874); 1 Stat. 117 (1790). Forfeiture of estates resulting from
a conviction has been constitutionally proscribed by Art. III, § 3, though forfeitures of
estates for the lifetime of a traitor has been sanctioned, see Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92
U.S. 202 (1876). But "[l]ong before the adoption of the Constitution the common law
courts in the Colonies - and later in the states during the period of Confederation -
were exercising jurisdiction in rem in the enforcement of [English and local] forfeiture
statutes," C.J. Henry Co. v. Moore, supra, at 139, which provided for the forfeiture of
commodities and vessels used in violations of customs and revenue laws. See id., at 145-
148; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). And almost immediately after
adoption of the Constitution, ships and cargoes involved in customs offenses were made
subject to forfeiture under federal law, as were vessels used to deliver slaves to foreign
countries, and somewhat later those used to deliver slales to this country. The enactment
of forfeiture statutes has not abated; contemporary federal and state forfeiture statutes
reach virtually any type of property that might be used in the conduct of a criminal
enterprise.
Id. at 680-83 (footnotes omitted); see also Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806-08; United States v. 92 Buena Vista
Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1131-34 (1993) (plurality opinion).
210. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 550/12, 570/505
(1992); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6801 (Supp. 1992); XVASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 69.50.505 (West
Supp. 1992).
211. 18 U.S.C. § 924(d)(1) (1988).
212. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c) (1988).
213. 16 U.S.C. § 3374 (1988); see also 16 U.S.C. § 670j(c) (1988) (illegally hunting, trapping, or
fishing on public lands); 18 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988 & Supp III 1991) (dealing in child pornography);
18 U.S.C. § 2344(c) (1988) (trafficking in contraband cigarettes); 18 U.S.C. § 2513 (1988) (illegally
using electronic surveillance devices); 19 U.S.C. § 1527(b) (1988) (illegally importing wild mammals
or birds); 25 U.S.C. § 264 (1988) (trading on Indian lands without a license); AMIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2314 (Supp. 1992) (racketeering); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/36-1 (1993) (numerous offenses); TEx.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 59.02 (XVest Supp. 1993) (numerous felonies).
214. E.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984) (forfeiture
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in rem forfeiture of property in a civil proceeding can constitute "punishment" for
purposes of double jeopardy analysis 15
In the years immediately following the Supreme Court's decision in Halper, the
vast majority of lower courts considering the issue held that the forfeiture of
property (including currency)2 to the government in an in rem proceeding does
not constitute "punishment" under Halper."17 Therefore, the courts reasoned that
proceedings under the Gun Control Act of 1968); United States v. Price, 914 F.2d 1507, 1512-13 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (forfeiture proceedings under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970); United States ex rel. Fulton v. Franzen, 659 F.2d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 1981)
(proceedings for forfeiture of vessels, vehicles, and aircraft used in the commission of various offenses),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982); see also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
237 (1972) (per curiam) (forfeiture of goods under the Tariff Act of 1930 is remedial).
215. Of course, if the forfeiture is an additional criminal penalty imposed by the legislature upon
a convicted defendant, double jeopardy principles clearly apply in the forfeiture action. State v.
Casalicchio, 569 N.E.2d 916, 921 (Ohio 1991) (interpreting the applicable forfeiture statute, which
required a criminal conviction for a felony and insulated innocent lien holders and property owners from
loss, as imposing an additional criminal penalty for the underlying felony, and holding that therefore the
forfeiture of the defendant's automobile, in which the police discovered cocaine and a plastic tube used
for inhaling cocaine, violated the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against multiple punishments
because the state sought the forfeiture after the defendant already had been sentenced for possession of
cocaine and possession of a criminal tool).
216. United States v. Cunningham, 943 F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (text in Westlaw);
United States v. $446,172.00 U.S. Currency, No. CIV. A. 92-2656, 1993 WL 26769, at *3-4 (D.N.J. Feb.
3, 1993); United States v. $11,400 in United States Currency, No. CIV. 92-431 TUC JMR, 1992 WL
394244, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 20, 1992); United States v. United States Currency in the Amount of
$145,139, 803 F. Supp. 592, 596-97 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Walker v. State, 828 S.W.2d 485, 491 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992); Exparte Rogers, 804 S.W.2d 945, 950-51 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
217. United States v. Borromeo, 995 F.2d 23, 27 (4th Cir. 1993) (forfeiture of six parcels of land,
two vehicles, and bank and investment accounts, securities, and insurance policies that allegedly were
proceeds of a doctor's unlawfully dispensing controlled substances, following doctor's conviction for
unlawfully prescribing controlled substances); United States v. Cullen, 979 F.2d 992, 994, 995 (4th Cir.
1992) (forfeiture of building housing a clinic and pharmacy in which a doctor and his wife illegally
distributed controlled substances, following doctor's conviction for knowingly distributing controlled
substances outside the scope of his legitimate medical practice); United States v. All Beneficial Interest
in that Certain Installment Nate Dated January 12, 1987, in the Principal Amount of $92,500, 978 F.2d
1266 (9th Cir. 1992) (mem.) (text in Westlaw) (forfeiture of two promissory notes traced to real property
purchased with proceeds from illegal drug transactions, following claimant's conviction for operating a
continuing criminal enterprise to sell cocaine); United States v. McCaslin, 959 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir.)
(prosecution for, inter alia, rianufacturing, through propagation, marijuana, following forfeiture of real
property used by defendant to grow marijuana), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 382 (1992); United States v.
Cunningham, 943 F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (text in Westlaw) (prosecution for cocaine
distribution and money laund ring, following forfeiture of money used by defendant to purchase cocaine);
United States v. $446,172.00 U.S. Currency, No. CIV. A. 92-2656, 1993 WL 26769, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb.
3, 1993) (forfeiture of currency found in claimant's possession when he was leaving the country,
following claimant's conviction for failing to file a report while knowingly transporting currency outside
the country); United States v. $11,400 in United States Currency, No. CIV. 92-431 TUC JMR, 1992 WL
394244, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 20, 1992) (forfeiture of currency found in one claimant's possession when
he was leaving the country, following claimant's conviction for failing to file a report while knowingly
transporting currency outside the country); United States v. United States Currency in the Amount of
$145,139, 803 F. Supp. 592, 596-97 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (forfeiture of currency found in claimant's
possession when he was leaving the country, following claimant's conviction for failing to file a report
[Vol. 46:587
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol46/iss4/3
1993] THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE 629
while knowingly transporting currency outside the country); In re 1632 N. Santa Rita, 801 P.2d 432,435-
36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (forfeiture of lot and home in which claimant unlawfully possessed marijuana,
following claimant's conviction for unlawful possession of marijuana); In re Forfeiture of 1986 Pontiac
Firebird, 600 So. 2d 1178, 1179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (forfeiture of automobile in
which claimant possessed cocaine, following claimant's conviction for possession of cocaine); People v.
1988 Mercury Cougar, 607 N.E.2d 217, 223 (Il. 1992) (forfeiture of automobile in which claimant
possessed cocaine, following claimant's conviction for possession of cocaine); Allen v. State, 605 A.2d
994, 1000 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (prosecution for possession of marijuana, following forfeiture of
truck in which defendant possessed marijuana), cert. denied, 612 A.2d 1315 (Md. 1992); see also United
States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir.) (forfeitures that are not overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the value of the offense and those that serve other articulable, legitimate civil
purposes cannot be classified as punishment), cert. denied sub norn. Levin v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
55 (1992).
A few courts apparently read Halper to require that the value of the forfeited property be rationally
related to compensation of the government for its expenses in investigating and prosecuting the
underlying criminal activity and for any damages it may have suffered as a result of that criminal
activity, for these courts held that the particular forfeiture in question did not constitute "punishment"
under Halper only after finding such a relationship. In United States v. United States Fishing Vessel
Maylin, 725 F. Supp. 1222, 1223 (S.D. Fla. 1989), for example, the court, in denying the claimant's
motion to dismiss the government's action for the forfeiture of a fishing boat used by the claimant to
commit certain fish and game violations, pointed out that the government expended resources in
investigating and prosecuting the claimant and that the claimant damaged the wildlife that the violated
regulations sought to protect. It then concluded that the dollar value of the boat, $55,000, represented
an amount rationally related to the injury caused to the government by the claimant. Similarly, in Ex
parte Rogers, 804 S.W.2d 945, 951 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), the court held that the forfeiture of $6406 in
cash, two cars, a mobile phone, a television set, and two safes, which were seized during a search of the
claimant's residence that resulted in the discovery of 653 grams of "crack" cocaine and which were
derived from the sale, manufacture, or distribution of a controlled substance, was "reasonably related to
the government's injury and expenses" from the large scale drug distribution operation apparently taking
place from the claimant's residence. See also Walker v. State, 828 S.W.2d 485, 490-91 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992) (stating forfeiture of $7500 that was going to be used to purchase amphetamine not "so extreme
that it subject[ed] the offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damage caused").
And in United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41 (Ist Cir. 1989), the court, in holding Halper
inapplicable to the forfeiture of a 17.9 acre tract of land (including a home and other buildings thereon)
from which the police had seized approximately eighty live marijuana plants, fifty drying marijuana
plants, and marijuana seed, stated:
Forfeiture of the entire property is ajustifiable means to remedy the injury to the govern-
ment itself that results from illegal marijuana operations; hence the forfeiture would be
unlikely to constitute a "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause ....
... Even for an infraction of the narcotics laws far smaller in magnitude than that of
the appellants, forfeiture of the entire tract of land upon which the drugs were produced
or possessed with intent to distribute is justifiable as a means of remedying the
government's injury and loss. The ravages of drugs upon our nation and the billions the
government is being forced to spend upon investigation and enforcement - not to
mention the costs of drug-related crime and drug abuse treatment, rehabilitation, and
prevention - easily justify a recovery in excess of the strict value of the property actually
devoted to growing the illegal substance, in this case marijuana.
Id. at 43-44. In addition, at least one court found that the particular forfeiture statute in question served
the remedial purpose of allowing the government to recover its costs of investigation and prosecution,
and it upheld the forfeiture of the claimants' residence and motorhome, in which they had a total
unencumbered interest of $30,921, apparently because it was "roughly equivalent" to the expenses of
somewhat more than $26,000 that the government incurred in investigating and prosecuting the claimants
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the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the government from both convicting and
punishing an individual in a criminal proceeding and, in a separate civil proceeding,
obtaining the forfeiture of property used by that individual in connection with, or
traceable to, the same criminal activity."'
A number of these courts concluded that an in rem forfeiture imposed in a civil
proceeding can never constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes because
it is not a sanction imposed upon the criminal wrongdoer, but rather is a sanction
against the property itself..9 Support for this position can be found in the Supreme
for possession of cocaine and marijuana. State v. Clark, 844 P.2d 1029, 1033, 1035 (Wash. Ct. App.
1993). But see State v. Crenshaw, 548 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1989), where the state obtained the forfeiture
of an automobile based upon the owner's having possessed cocaine on his person while in the vehicle.
There, three dissenting justices concluded:
Although the Halper case involves a civil false claims statute rather than a forfeiture
statute, the reasoning applies to forfeiture with equal force. Forfeiture cannot be called
a remedial sanction. The purpose of forfeiture is not to make the state "whole," but rather
it is intended to deter drug possessors, sellers, and smugglers by seizing their assets and
thus penalizing ther financially. The state has not been harmed financially due to
Crenshaw's possession of a small quantity of cocaine. Because the forfeiture statute is
clearly intended to b- penal in nature rather than remedial, the double jeopardy clause of
the federal Constitution is implicated. The sole question here, as it was in Halper, is
whether the civil pcnalty assessed against Crenshaw constitutes a prohibited second
punishment.
The Court in Halper rejected the government's contention that criminal punishment can
only be meted out in criminal proceedings. It is clear that the forfeiture statute in question
here is penal in natue despite the civil proceeding in which it clothes itself. The penalty
of forfeiture imposed by the statute in this case becomes a punishment because "it exceeds
what 'could reasonably be regarded as the equivalent of compensation for the Govern-
ment's loss."' This forfeiture is, in my view, a second punishment and is prohibited by the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.
... In the few caces which have addressed forfeiture in terms of double jeopardy, the
United States Supreme Court has found that the double jeopardy clause did not apply
because the forfeiture proceedings were in rem proceedings, intended to be remedial rather
than punitive. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 104 S. Ct.
1099, 79 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1984); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United
States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S. Ct. 489, 34 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1972). In each of those case, the
forfeiture was in fact remedial and rationally related to the criminal conduct. Here, there
is specifically no rational relationship between the forfeited property and the criminal
conduct. Thus, the -ivil penalty of forfeiture is considered punitive, as was the civil
penalty imposed in Ilalper.
Id. at 229 (Kogan, J., disserting) (citations omitted).
218. See supra note 217.
219. United States v. McCaslin, 959 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 382 (1992);
United States v. $446,172.00 U.S. Currency, No. CIV. A. 92-2656, 1993 WL 26769, at *4 (D.NJ. Feb.
3, 1993); United States v. $11,400 in United States Currency, No. CIV. 92-431 TUC JMR, 1992 WL
394244, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 20, 1992); People v. 1988 Mercury Cougar, 607 N.E.2d 217, 222-23 (Ill.
1992) (alternative holding); Allen v. State, 605 A.2d 994, 1000 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (alternative
holding), cert. denied, 612 A.2d 1315 (Md. 1992); see also In re Forfeiture of 1986 Pontiac Firebird, 600
So. 2d 1178, 1179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) ("A forfeiture proceeding constitutes 'a civil,
in rem action that is independent of any factually related criminal actions.'").
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Court's decision in Various Items of Personal Property v. United States,'0 a civil
in rem action for the forfeiture of property used in defrauding the government of
a tax. There, the Court stated that in an in rem forfeiture proceeding
[i]t is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal
fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead
of inanimate and insentient. In a criminal prosecution it is the wrongdo-
er in person who is proceeded against, convicted and punished. The
forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal offense. The
provision of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution in respect of
double jeopardy does not applyY'
However, even if the holding in Various Items of Personal Property survived the
Supreme Court's decision in Halper, which is doubtful,' it cannot survive that
court's recent decision in Austin v. United States.' In Austin, the Supreme Court
held that in rem forfeitures of conveyances and real property under 21 U.S.C. §§
88 1(a)(4) and (a)(7) - two of the forfeiture provisions of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 197W' - are punitive in nature and
220. 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
221. Id. at 581 (citations omitted).
222. The Supreme Court in Halper emphasized that the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription
against multiple punishment safeguards "'humane interests,'" and that the protection it affords is
"intrinsically personal." Halper, 465 U.S. at 447. The Court then concluded that in determining whether
a sanction imposed in a civil proceeding constitutes "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy
analysis, the "civil" label affixed to the proceeding "is not of paramount importance." Id.; cf. Hicks ex
rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988) ("mhe labels affixed either to the proceeding or to the
relief imposed ... are not controlling and will not be allowed to defeat the applicable protections of
federal constitutional law."). Like the "civil" label in Halper, the "legal fiction" resorted to in Various
Items of Personal Property, as well as in the lower court cases interpreting Halper in the context of in
rem forfeitures, overlooks the realities of the situation. While it is true that the owner or possessor of
the property technically is not the defendant in an in rem forfeiture proceeding, she is the one who in
fact will suffer the consequences of a forfeiture. For that reason, "it is particularly appropriate to address
the substance of [the in rem] proceeding" and to "focus upon the effects [of the forfeiture] on the
claimant who has violated the statute." United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 36 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Levin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
223. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
224. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (a)(7) (1988). Subsections 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) provide:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right
shall exist in them:
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or
are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation,
sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of [controlled substances, their raw
materials, and equipment used in their manufacture and distribution], except that-
(C) no conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful
blindness of the owner.
1993]
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therefore subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.' In
reaching this result, the Court rejected the argument that a statutory in rem forfeiture
does not impose punishment upon the owner of the forfeited property because "the
property itself is 'guilty' of the offense."' The Court explained that "[t]he fiction
'that the thing is primarily considered the offender"" "rest[s] on the notion that
the owner who allows his property to become involved in an offense has been
negligent,"'2 and that the forfeiture serves to punish the owner for his negli-
gence. 9 In addition, the Court stated that reliance by the government on the
technical distinction between in rem proceedings and proceedings in personam to
conclude that forfeitures under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) do not constitute punishment
"would be misplaced,""23 because "'[t]he fictions of in rem forfeiture were
developed primarily to expand the reach of the courts,' . . . which, particularly in
admiralty proceedings, might have lacked in personam jurisdiction over the owner
of the property."'" In light of this language in Austin, the rationale that an in rem
forfeiture imposed in a civil proceeding can never constitute "punishment" for
double jeopardy purposes because it is a sanction against the property itself, and not
against the criminal 'A rongdoer, cannot stand.
Other lower courts applying Halper to in rem forfeitures did not rely upon the
fact that the forfeiture proceeding was an in rem action against the property itself.
Rather, these courts concluded that the particular forfeiture in question did not
constitute "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause because it
served a remedial purpose - either removing the instrument of a crime from
general circulation, thereby preventing the further illicit use of a harmful object,
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances
or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this title punishable by
more than one yeir's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under
this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge or consent of that owner.
Id.
225. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
226. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2808.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2809.
229. Id. at 2808-09.
230. Id. at 2809 n.9.
231. ,Id. (quoting Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554, 559 (1992)).
232. United States v. Cullen, 979 F.2d 992, 994, 995 (4th Cir. 1992) (forfeiture of building housing
a clinic and pharmacy in which a doctor and his wife illegally distributed controlled substances); United
States v. United States Currmncy in the Amount of $145,139, 803 F. Supp. 592, 596-97 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(forfeiture of currency which one claimant failed to report when he was leaving the country); In re 1632
N. Santa Rita, 801 P.2d 432, 436 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (forfeiture of lot and home in which claimant
unlawfully possessed marijuana); People v. 1988 Mercury Cougar, 607 N.E.2d 217, 223 (I1. 1992)
(forfeiture of automobile in which claimant possessed cocaine).
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or reducing the incentive for engaging in illegal activity by preventing a wrongdoer
from profiting from her illegal activity. 3 For example, it was held that where the
government seeks the forfeiture of an instrumentality of crime, i.e., "property [that]
has been used substantially to accomplish illegal purposes, so that the property itself
can be said to be 'culpable,"'" to remove it from general circulation and thereby
"mak[e] it more difficult for the crime to be repeated," 5 the forfeiture "will not
be presumed punitive,"' and Halper does not require an accounting, or even a
rough estimate, of the government's damages and expenses in the particular case." 7
As the court explained in United States v. Cullen, an in rem proceeding for the
forfeiture of a building owned by a doctor and his wife and used by them to
unlawfully distribute controlled substances:
Halper involved a civil penalty intended to substitute for damages
suffered by the government for the fraudulent acts committed upon it.
The remedial purpose of that penalty was one of compensation, and the
amount sought by the government overwhelmed any realistic estimate
of the government's pecuniary loss. Here, by contrast, the government
seeks the forfeiture of the Cullens' building not to compensate itself for
any costs of investigation or prosecution, but to remove what had
become a harmful instrumentality in the hands of the Cullens. The
public danger that the building poses in the hands of the Cullens bears
little relation to its monetary value, small or large.
Moreover, to limit the forfeitability of assets to the costs incurred by
the government in connection with a criminal case would undercut
Congress' purposes in enacting the forfeiture provisions. It would tend
to exempt from forfeiture the most substantial investments in the
instrumentalities of the drug trade. Granting constitutional immunity to
233. United States v. Borromeo, 995 F.2d 23, 27 (4th Cir. 1993) (forfeiture of six parcels of land,
two vehicles, and bank and investment accounts, securities, and insurance policies that allegedly were
the proceeds of a doctor's unlawfully dispensing controlled substances); see also United States v.
Cunningham, 757 F. Supp. 840, 846 (S.D. Ohio), affd, 943 F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1991) (table).
234. United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub noa.,
Levin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
235. People v. 1988 Mercury Cougar, 607 N.E.2d 217, 223 (I11. 992).
236. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 36.
237. United States v. Cullen, 979 F.2d 992, 995 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. 38 Whalers Cove
Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992); United States v. Cunningham, 943
F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (text in Westlaw); United States v. United States Currency in the
Amount of $145,139, 803 F. Supp. 592, 596-97 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re 1632 N. Santa Rita, 801 P.2d
432, 435 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); People v. 1988 Mercury Cougar, 607 N.E.2d 217, 223 (Ill. 1992).
In People v. 1988 Mercury Cougar, the court rejected the claimant's contention that because he was
a paraplegic and dependent upon his specially equipped automobile for transportation, the forfeiture of
that vehicle, in which the police had discovered cocaine, constituted "punishment" for double jeopardy
purposes. The court reasoned that "[t]he determination of whether a civil sanction constitutes punishment
within the multiple-punishment prong of the double jeopardy clause ... is not based upon a defendant's
particular circumstances, including any physical disability." 1988 Mercury Cougar, 607 N.E.2d at 223.
238. 979 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1992).
1993]
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those who emplcy extremely valuable assets when committing crimes
would create a disparity between rich and poor defendants. As a
principle of civil forfeiture, this makes little sense. So far as the public
welfare is concerned, the Ferrari is at least as harmful an instrumentality
as the Chevette."9
Similarly, Halper was held inapplicable to the forfeiture of assets traceable to illegal
drug transactions, because "a rule permitting those criminals who had most
successfully parlayed their drug-related income into substantial assets to retain those
assets would frustrate a remedial purpose of the [forfeiture] provision " " - "to
reduce the incentive for engaging in such activity."' "
Except in limited circumstances, however, the rationale that an in rem forfeiture
serves a remedial purpcse and, hence, does not constitute "punishment" for purposes
of the Double Jeopardy Clause cannot survive the Supreme Court's decision in
Austin v. United States.24 In holding that in rem forfeitures of property under 21
U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) constitute "punishment" and thus are subject to the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the Court in Austin first
concluded that in the United States statutory in rem forfeitures "historically have
been understood, at least in part, as punishment.""4 3 The Court pointed out that in
various statutes the First Congress listed the forfeiture of goods alongside other
provisions for punishment and often used the word "forfeit" to mean "fine," as in
section 12 of the Act cf July 31, 1789,' which provided that an individual "shall
forfeit and pay the sum of four hundred dollars for every offence." 4 The Court
in Austin also noted that its prior cases had consistently recognized that statutory in
rem forfeiture serves, a.t least in part, to punish the owner of the property."
239. Id. at 995.
240. United States v. Borromeo, 995 F.2d 23, 27 (4th Cir. 1993).
241. Id.
242. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
243. Id. at 2810.
244. Act of July 31, 17139, ch. 5, § 12, 1 Stat. 29, 39.
245. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2807 (quoting Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. at 39). The Court in Austin
noted that "[d]ictionaries of the time confirm that 'fine' was understood to include 'forfeiture' and vice
versa." Id. at 2808.
246. Id. at 2810. The Court first relied upon Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347 (1808), where
it held that goods removed from the custody of a revenue officer without payment of duties were not
forfeitable for that reason unless they were removed with the consent of the owner or his agent. In
Peisch, a unanimous Court stated:
The court is also of the opinion that the removal for which the act punishes the owner
with a forfeiture of the goods must be made with his consent or connivance, or with that
of some person employed or trusted by him.
If, by private theft, or open robbery, without any fault on his part, his property should
be invaded, while ir the custody of the officer of the revenue, the law cannot be
understood to punish him with the forfeiture of that property.
Id. at 364 (emphasis added). The Austin Court then stated that its prior cases rejecting the "innocence"
of the owner as a common-law defense to forfeiture rested upon "the notion that the owner [was]
negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that he is properly punished for that negligence."
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2808.
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After examining the historical understanding of statutory in rem forfeitures, the
Austin Court examined the specific provisions and legislative history of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) and concluded that nothing in them "contradicts] the
historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment."" The Court found that the
"innocent owner" defense contained in those sections serves "to focus the provisions
on the culpability of the owner,"' thereby revealing a legislative intent "to punish
only those involved in drug trafficking." 49 The Court also noted that Congress
chose "to tie forfeiture directly to the commission of drug offenses."' Finally, the
Court found that by adding section (a)(7) to section 881, "Congress recognized 'that
the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter
or punish the enormously profitable drug trade in dangerous drugs,"'"' and
"characterized the forfeiture of real property as 'a powerful deterrent."'"
More importantly, perhaps, the Court in Austin expressly rejected the govern-
ment's arguments that forfeitures under sections 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) should be
considered remedial because (1) "they remove the 'instruments' of the drug trade
'thereby protecting the community from the threat of continued drug dealing,""
and (2) "the forfeited assets serve to compensate the Government for the expense
of law enforcement activity and for its expenditure on societal problems such as
urban blight, drug addiction, and other health concerns resulting from the drug
trade."' With respect to the government's first argument, the Court acknowledged
that "the forfeiture of contraband itself may be characterized as remedial because
it removes dangerous or illegal items from society.' ' " Nevertheless, it concluded
that neither conveyances used to transport or otherwise facilitate drug trafficking,
nor real property used to commit or facilitate the commission of drug offenses, can
be characterized as "instruments" of the drug trade, because "'[t]here is nothing even
remotely criminal in possessing [these items]."'" As to the government's second
argument, the Court found that "the dramatic variations in the value of conveyances
and real property forfeitable under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) undercut any"z"
argument that these provisions are "'a reasonable form of liquidated damages."''z
Therefore, the Court concluded that "the 'forfeiture of property... [is] a penalty
that ha[s] absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by society or to the
cost of enforcing the law."'"
247. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810.
248. Id. at 2811.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. (quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965)).
257. Id. at 2812.
258. Id. at 2811.
259. Id. at 2812 (brackets supplied by Court).
1993]
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Moreover, the Austin Court concluded that even if forfeitures under sections
881(a)(4) and (a)(7) serve some remedial purpose, they still must be deemed
punishment for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause.' The Court reasoned
that, under Halper, a civil sanction must be deemed punishment if it does not solely
serve a remedial purpose." It found it obvious that "[i]n light of the historical
understanding of forfeiture as punishment, the clear focus of sections 881(a)(4) and
(a)(7) on the culpability of the owner, and the evidence that Congress understood
those provisions as serving to deter and to punish,"' forfeiture under sections
881(a)(4) and (a)(7) does not serve solely a remedial purpose.' Additionally, the
Court noted that although in Halper it "focused on whether 'the sanction as applied
in the individual case serves the goals of punishment,"'' " it made sense in Austin
"to focus on §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) as a whole."' This was because, unlike
Halper, which "involved a small, fixed-penalty provision, which 'in the ordinary
case... can be said to do no more than make the Government whole,"'2a "[t]he
value of the conveyances and real property forfeitable under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)
... can vary so dramatically that any relationship between the Government's actual
costs and the amount of the sanction is merely coincidental."' 7
Although Austin dealt with the issue of whether certain statutory in rem
forfeitures constitute punishment for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court used the definition of "punishment"
articulated in 'Halper to decide that issue. It thereby indicated that whatever
constitutes "punishment" for Eighth Amendment purposes also constitutes
"punishment" for Fifth Amendment double jeopardy purposes.' Applying Austin
in this latter context leads to the conclusion that the statutory in rem forfeiture of
real or personal property that is not itself contraband, based upon the property's
mere use in drug or other criminal offenses, constitutes "punishment" for purposes
of double jeopardy analysis. Therefore, under Halper, the government cannot both
convict and punish an individual in a criminal proceeding and, in a separate civil
proceeding, obtain the forfeiture of noncontraband property used by that individual
in connection with the same criminal activity.
Austin and Halper compel the same conclusion with respect to the forfeiture of
money, negotiable instruments, and securities used to facilitate any controlled
substance law violations; money, negotiable instruments, securities, and other things
of value furnished in exchange for illicit controlled substances; and proceeds
traceable to such an exchange for illicit controlled substances. These items, like the
conveyances and real property at issue in Austin, do not constitute contraband,
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 2812 n.14.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 2806, 2812
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because "[t]here is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing [them]."' Thus,
their forfeiture cannot be justified on the ground of protecting the community by
removing the "instruments" of the drug trade. Moreover, the legislative history of
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) indicates that Congress intended the forfeiture of such items
to serve as an additional punishment on individuals engaged in illegal drug
activity.'
Similarly, the in rem forfeiture of currency or monetary instruments used in
transactions that were not reported to the government as required by law should be
deemed "punishment" under Austin and Halper. Although it has been said that
unreported currency or an unreported monetary instrument "becomes an instru-
ment[ality] of crime at the moment the traveler fails to declare it,"'7 neither
currency nor monetary instruments are dangerous or illegal in themselves. Thus,
their forfeiture cannot be justified on the ground of protecting the public.
On the other hand, under Austin, the statutory in rem forfeiture of contraband,
such as controlled substances and unlicensed guns,2' should not be deemed
"punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. These forfeitures serve
the remedial purpose of "remov[ing] dangerous or illegal items from society."
2'
Thus, the government should not be precluded by the double jeopardy provision
from convicting and punishing an individual for a criminal offense, such as the
possession or manufacturing of a controlled substance, and obtaining, in a separate
civil proceeding, the forfeiture of the contraband that serves as the basis for the
criminal proceeding. The same result should be reached with respect to the in rem
forfeiture of raw materials of controlled substances. For, although each particular
item may not be dangerous or illegal in itself, their spatial relationship to each
other, under circumstances indicating they were intended be used to produce illegal
and dangerous drugs, should be sufficient to allow them to be deemed "contraband"
for purposes of Austin.
B. Suspension or Revocation of an Individual's Driver's License
Courts have consistently held that the suspension of a person's driver's license
because of misconduct related to the use of a motor vehicle, such as driving with
269. Id. at 2811 (quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965)).
270. Joint House-Senate Explanation of Senate Amendment to Titles II and III of the Psychotropic
Substances Act of 1978, 124 CONG. REc. 34,671 (1978) (noting "the penal nature of forfeiture statutes").
271. United States v. United States Currency in the Amount of $145,139, 803 F. Supp. 592, 597
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
272. In conceding that it previously had recognized that the forfeiture of contraband may be
characterized as remedial, the Court in Austin cited United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465
U.S. 354 (1984), where the Court concluded that the forfeiture mechanism of the Gun Control Act of
1968 "is a separate civil sanction, remedial in nature," id. at 366, aimed at "[k]eeping potentially
dangerous weapons out of the hands of unlicensed [gun] dealers," id. at 364, and therefore held that a
gun owner's acquittal of criminal charges that he had knowingly engaged in the business of dealing in
firearms without a license did not bar a subsequent in rem forfeiture proceeding against those same
firearms based upon their involvement in the same transaction for which the gun owner had been
acquitted, id.
273. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811.
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a blood-alcohol content greater than a specified level or refusing to take a
breathalyzer test, does not constitute "punishment" under HalperY' As a result,
these courts conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude the
government from both convicting an individual in a criminal proceeding and, on the
basis of the same conduct, suspending her driver's license in a separate civil
proceeding. 5 As a general matter, this conclusion is undoubtedly correct.
Statutory schemes providing for the revocation or suspension of an individual's
driver's license for conduct involving the use of a motor vehicle clearly serve a
remedial purpose. As one court has explained:
The revocation of a driver's license is part of a civil/regulatory
scheme that serves a vastly different governmental purpose from
criminal punishment. Our State's interest is to foster safety by tempo-
rarily removing from public thoroughfares those licensees who have
exhibited dangerous behavior, which interest is grossly different from
the criminal penalties that are available in a driving while under the
influence prosecutionY
While this purpose may "not [be] 'remedial' in the sense meant by the Halper
decision, '"2' because it does not compensate an injured party for a tangible
loss,27 the suspension or revocation of a person's driver's license should not be
characterized as a deterrent or retribution, and therefore should not be deemed
"punishment" for double jeopardy purposes.'
274. United States v. Bulloch, 994 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1993) (table) (text in Westlaw); State v.
Nichols, 819 P.2d 995, 9981 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Ellis v. Pierce, 282 Cal. Rptr. 93, 95-96 (Ct. App.
1991); Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 1992) (per curiam); State v. Maze,
825 P.2d 1169, 1174 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992); Butler v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 609 So.
2d 790, 797 (La. 1992); Johnson v. State, 622 A.2d 199, 205-06 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); State v.
Strong, 605 A.2d 510, 514 (Vt. 1992); see also No Illegal Points, Citizens for Drivers Rights, Inc. v.
Florin, 624 A.2d 981, 989-90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (assessment of points by Division of
Motor Vehicles for traffic violations does not constitute punishment, even though accumulation of points
can lead to revocation of an individual's driver's license).
275. See supra note 274.
276. Maze, 825 P.2d at 1174; see also Nichols, 819 P.2d at 999 ("'[t]he purpose of the implied
consent law is to remove from Arizona highways those drivers who may be a menace to themselves and
others because of intoxication'"); Butler, 609 So. 2d at 797 ("The [Implied Consent Law's] primary effect
is remedial; it removes those drivers from our state highways who have been proven to be reckless or
hazardous. It effectuates tfeir removal through a license suspension .... ); Johnson, 622 A.2d at 205
("The purpose of [the mandlatory suspension statute] is to protect other drivers on the road from those
who would drive while intoxicated and to deter those who would otherwise decide to drive drunk.");
Strong, 605 A.2d at 513 ("The summary suspension scheme serves the rational remedial purpose of
protecting public safety by quickly removing potentially dangerous drivers from the roads.").
277. Ellis, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
278. Id.; Freeman, 611 So. 2d at 1261.
279. Ellis, 282 Cal. Fl.ptr. at 94-95 ("The immediate purpose (of the drivers' license suspension
statute] is merely to facilitate the gathering of evidence. The long-range purpose is to protect public
safety by keeping drunk drivers off public roads."); Freeman, 611 So. 2d at 1261 ("[T]he purpose of the
statute providing for revocation of a driver's license upon conviction of a licensee for driving while
intoxicated is to provide an administrative remedy for public protection and not for punishment of the
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It is true of course that the suspension or revocation of an individual's driver's
license may deter that person and others from engaging in the conduct that led to
the suspension or revocation; it also may be viewed by the licensee as retribu-
tion."' Indeed, the suspension or revocation of a person's driver's license can be
extremely inconvenient and can have severe monetary ramifications on one who
uses a motor vehicle in her occupation or profession.' Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court recognized in Halper that "for the defendant even remedial sanctions carry
the sting of punishment."' Consequently, where the suspension or revocation of
an individual's driver's license is designed primarily "to protect public safety by
keeping drunk drivers off public roads,"' the fact that it incidentally serves some
of the purposes of punishment should not transform the sanction into "punishment"
for double jeopardy purposes.'
This is not to say, however, that the suspension or revocation of an individual's
driver's license in a civil proceeding can never constitute "punishment" for purposes
of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The revocation or lengthy suspension of an
individual's driver's license for a relatively minor traffic offense, such as driving
with a broken tail light or exceeding the speed limit by a few miles per hour, in the
absence of any previous traffic violations, seems excessive and appears to serve a
punitive, rather than remedial, purpose. Under such circumstances, at least a portion
of the sanction would seem to constitute "punishment" for purposes of double
jeopardy analysis. That is, a brief suspension of the individual's driving privileges
would be "remedial," but anything beyond that must be deemed "punishment."'
offender."). See cases cited supra note 274.
280. See Butler, 609 So. 2d at 797; Johnson, 622 A.2d at 205-06; Strong, 605 A.2d at 513.
281. See Nichols, 819 P.2d at 999.
282. See, e.g., Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 596 N.E.2d 340, 342 (Mass. 1992) (two
individuals whose driver's licenses were suspended were truck drivers and a third lived 30 miles from
his place of employment without access to public transportation); see also Johnson, 622 A.2d at 205-06
(defendant claimed that "'[o]ther than incarceration, no punishment handed down by any court is greater
that denying to a person who relies on his automobile the use of that automobile by taking away his
privilege to drive."').
283. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 n.7 (1989).
284. Ellis, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
285. Nichols, 819 P.2d at 1000; Butler, 609 So. 2d at 797; Johnson, 622 A.2d at 205-06; Strong,
605 A.2d at 514.
286. At least two courts have indicated that the length of the suspension must be rationally related
to the remedial goal of the suspension. Butler, 609 So. 2d at 797 ("Unlike Halper's disproportionate fine,
Butler's license suspension is temporary (90 days), the last 60 days of which he will be able to obtain
a restricted license. Furthermore, Butler's license suspension, in contrast to Halper's fine, bears a rational
relationship to the legitimate governmental purpose of promoting public safety on Louisiana highways.
... To the end that a temporary revocation of driving privileges meets the stated objective of highway
safety, we conclude that the statutorily authorized license suspension to be not so divorced from its
intended remedial goal that it amounts to a second punishment for the same offense in violation of
double jeopardy.") (emphasis added); Strong, 605 A.2d at 513 ("The minimum suspension period [in the
driver's license suspension scheme] is not excessive in relation to the remedial purpose ....") (emphasis
added).
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The suspension o:s revocation of a person's driver's license for an offense
unrelated to the operation of a motor vehicle would also seem to be punitive in
nature. For example, in Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, the court
concluded that a statutory scheme requiring the State Department of Revenue and
Taxation to suspend the driver's license of a person under nineteen years of age who
had been convicted of violating any law regarding the possession, delivery,
manufacture, or use of a controlled substance or alcohol violated the double
jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions because it provided for a
second punishment for the same offensem The court reasoned that the provision
calling for the suspension of the minor's driver's license by an administrative
agency, after judicial involvement in the case had ended with the sentencing of the
minor, "was driven by deterrent and retribution concepts."' Since the individual's
driver's license could be suspended for an offense that did not involve the use of a
motor vehicle, it is fair to say that the primary purpose of the suspension provision
was not to protect the public from unsafe drivers. Instead, its purpose was to
impose an additional punishment on certain underage drinkers and drug users as a
form of retribution and a means of deterring them, and others like them, from
engaging in such conduct in the future. The Johnson court therefore reached the
correct result.'
C. Suspension or Revocation of an Individual's License
to Engage in a Particular Profession or Business
As with the suspension or revocation of a person's driver's license, courts agree
that the suspension or revocation of a person's license to engage in a particular
profession or busine;s, when based upon misconduct relevant to her fitness to
engage in that profession or business, does not constitute "punishment" under
Halper." Therefore, courts have found that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
287. 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1992).
288. Id. at 180 (basin.g its decision solely upon state constitutional grounds).
289. Id. at 179 (stating that it "was certainly not intended to be remedial in repaying an injured
victim").
290. Compare Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 596 N.E.2d 340 (Mass. 1992), which
involved a statute requiring the Registrar of Motor Vehicles automatically to suspend, for a period not
to exceed five years, the driver's license of a person convicted of violating the state's Controlled
Substances Act. The Rushvworth court held that although the suspension of an individual's driver's license
under the statute constitutes "punishment," it does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court first
noted that in the context cf multiple punishments in a single proceeding the Double Jeopardy Clause
merely prohibits greater pt nishment than the legislature intended. It then concluded that the legislature
specifically authorized the cumulative punishment of a driver's license suspension and that the automatic
license suspension by tha Registrar of Motor Vehicles was "an ancillary part of the criminal
proceedings." Id. at 345. The court distinguished Halper on the ground that it "involved the imposition
of civil penalties in separate noncriminal proceedings against individuals who had been convicted in
previous criminal proceedings." Id.
291. Moser v. Richmond County Bd. of Comm'rs, 428 S.E.2d 71, 72-73 (Ga. 1993) (revocation of
business license to operate health spa); Kvitka v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 551 N.E.2d 915,
918 n.4 (Mass.) (revocaticn of medical license), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 823 (1990); In re Cobb, 402
S.E.2d 475, 477 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (five-year suspension of chiropractor's license, suspended with
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preclude the government from both convicting an individual in a criminal
proceeding and, in a separate civil proceeding and on the basis of the same conduct,
revoking or suspending her business or professional license.' Once again, as a
general matter, these courts have reached the correct result.
The primary purpose of the revocation or suspension of such a license is not to
punish; rather, it is to protect the public from individuals who are deemed unfit to
practice that profession or engage in that business. ' For example, the disbarment
or suspension of an attorney for committing a crime of moral turpitude is aimed at
probation and a 90-day active suspension); see also United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839, 844-45 (7th
Cir. 1992) (prohibition on a commodities broker's trading on any contract market, even as a customer,
imposed because of his fraudulent practices, serves "to ensure the integrity of the markets and protects
them from people like [the defendant]," and therefore is a remedial measure); United States v. Reed, 937
F.2d 575, 578 (1 Ith Cir. 1991) (thirty-day "disciplinary suspension" of a government employee imposed
by an arbitrator for the employee's on-the-job conduct can be "best characterized as an attempt by the
arbitrator to vindicate the contract rights of the government - and of [the employee] - under the
collective bargaining agreement between them," and "as long as it was within the framework provided
by [the] employment contract," it serves a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, namely, to
remedy a breach of contract, thereby making the government whole, and "is by its nature remedial");
Manocchio v. Sullivan, 768 F. Supp. 814, 816 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (dictum) ("Disqualifying a person...
from practicing a profession because of offensive activity is not punishment, if the past activity is such
that the public would have an interest in excluding the offender."), affd, 961 F.2d 1539 (1Ith Cir. 1992);
Ayars v. Department of Corrections, 597 A.2d 1084, 1087-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (forfeiture
of public employment is intended "to provide complete and adequate safeguards to the public against
those who breach its trust," and therefore removal of a senior correction officer from his position because
of a criminal conviction for failing to file an income tax return with intent to evade the tax does not
constitute "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis); cf. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S.
189 (1898) (exclusion of a convicted felon from the practice of medicine is not punitive and therefore
cannot violate the Ex Post Facto Clause).
292. See supra note 291.
293. Ellis, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (dictum); Moser, 428 S.E.2d at 72-73; see also State Bar Ass'n v.
Frank, 325 A.2d 718, 722 (Md. 1974) ("'In [an attorney] disciplinary matter, the primary purpose is not
to punish an offender; it is to protect the public against members of the bar who are unworthy of the trust
and confidence essential to the relationship of attorney and client; it is to ascertain whether the conduct
of the attorney involved has demonstrated his unfitness to practice law, and if so to deprive him of his
previously acquired privilege to serve as an officer of the court.'"); Cocco v. Commission on Medical
Discipline, 384 A.2d 766, 768-69 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) ("[D]isciplinary proceedings against a
professional have the unique purpose of protecting the public from the results of a professional's
improper conduct, incompetence or unscrupulous practices."), affid in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Unnamed Physician v. Commission on Medical Discipline, 400 A.2d 396 (Md.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
868 (1979); Wang v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 537 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Mass. 1989) ("The
board's purpose is protection of the public interest, and when the board exercises its statutory function
of conducting disciplinary proceedings, it is pursuing that purpose."); In re Logan, 358 A.2d 787, 790
(N.J.) (per curiam) ("The purpose of a disciplinary sanction [upon an attorney], whether it be a
reprimand, suspension, or a disbarment, is not punishment, but maintenance of the integrity and purity
of the bar, elimination of unfit persons from the practice of law, and vindication of public confidence
in the bar and the administration of justice."), on reh'g, 367 A.2d 419 (NJ. 1976); In re Oxman, 437
A.2d 1169, 1172 (Pa. 1981) ("'Mhe primary purpose of professional disciplinary proceedings is to
protect the public."'), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d
1062, 1069 (Wash. 1991) ("A medical disciplinary proceeding ... is taken for two purposes: to protect
the public, and to protect the standing of the medical profession in the eyes of the public.").
1993]
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protecting the public by keeping an unfit lawyer from practicing law2 Similarly,
when a state board revokes or suspends a physician's license to practice medicine
for unlawfully dispensing controlled substances, it is doing so to protect the public
from an unscrupulous, and even dangerous, doctor."'5 While this may not be
"remedial" in the same sense as used by the Supreme Court in Halper,2  that is,
it is not intended to compensate the government for its damages and costs resulting
from the licensee's misconduct, it clearly does not constitute "punishment" as that
term is used in Halper. Although the suspension or revocation may act as a
deterrent, both generally and specifically, and may be viewed as retribution by the
individual affected, neither deterrence nor retribution is the major goal of a license
suspension or revocation.'
One court has hinted, however, that the suspension or revocation of a person's
license to engage in a particular profession or business may, in a particular case, be
so disproportional to her misconduct that it would constitute "punishment" under
Halper for purposes of double jeopardy analysis.293 In United States v. Furlett,'
the court held that a civil sanction prohibiting a commodities broker from trading
on any contract market, even as a retail customer using another broker, imposed for
fraud in the trading of commodity futures contracts, represented a remedial, rather
than punitive, measure.' The court reasoned that the decision to exclude the
commodities broker fiom trading on any contract market could be seen as "an action
to ensure the integrity of the markets and protect them from people like [the
commodities broker]." 1  The court concluded that in light of the "'pernicious,
widespread, and institutionalized""'a nature of the broker's fraud, which took place
'without abatement or restraint over a period of years,"'3 "the decision to bar him
from all further trading activity reasonably can be viewed as a remedial measure
294. Ellis, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (dictum); see also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 & n.2
(1938) (disbarment is a sanction "free of the punitive criminal element"); State Bar Ass'n v. Frank, 325
A.2d 718, 722 (Md. 1974); In re Logan, 358 A.2d 787, 790 (N.J.) (per curiam), on reh'g, 367 A.2d 419
(NJ. 1976); In re Oxman, 437 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Pa. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); In re
Disciplinary Action of McCune, 717 P.2d 701, 707 (Utah 1986).
295. See Kvitkav.Bord of Registration in Medicine, 551 N.E.2d 915,916-17 (Mass.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 823 (1990); see also Wang v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 537 N.E.2d 1216, 1219
(Mass. 1989); Cocco v. Comnmission on Medical Discipline, 384 A.2d 766, 768-69 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1978), affid in part, rev'd i part sub nom. Unnamed Physician v. Commission on Medical Discipline,
400 A.2d 396 (Md.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d
1062, 1069 (Wash. 1991).
296. See Ellis, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95.
297. Moser, 428 S.E.2d at 72-73; see also Ellis, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
298. See United State., v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1992).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 844-45.
301. Id. at 844.
302. Id. (quoting the opinion of the administrative law judge).
303. Id.
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commensurate with his wrongdoing."'' It further stated that the trading bar "is not
out of proportion to [the broker's] fraudulent practices.""re
This language in Furlett indicates that the permanent prohibition barring the
commodities broker from trading on any contract exchange, even as a customer,
might have constituted "punishment" if his misconduct had been less serious than
it was, perhaps, for example, a single instance of fraud. Whether the court would
have viewed the permanent revocation of his registration with the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (in effect, his license to engage in business as a
commodities broker) in the same light is unclear. It could be argued that the
revocation or lengthy suspension of an individual's license to engage in a particular
business or profession because of a single, relatively minor transgression cannot be
justified in terms of protecting the public, and that at least a portion of the
revocation or suspension must be treated as "punishment" for double jeopardy
purposes.
On the other hand, the revocation or lengthy suspension of a person's license to
practice a particular profession or to engage in a certain business can be viewed as
a means of protecting the public, regardless of the nature and frequency of the
underlying misconduct. For example, a lawyer who has been convicted of a minor
criminal offense or who has misappropriated a client's funds, whatever the amount,
has shown her unfitness to practice law, and one would be hard put to argue that
barring that person from practicing law, either permanently or for a lengthy period
of time, would not be primarily for the purpose of protecting the public. The same
would be true, for example, where a doctor has on a single occasion unlawfully
dispensed a controlled substance. Even though the doctor may have misbehaved
only once, she has shown her willingness, and perhaps propensity, to engage in
illegal and even dangerous conduct. Permanently barring that doctor from practicing
medicine, or suspending her from doing so for a lengthy period of time, certainly
can be justified as a means of protecting the public.
D. Exclusion of an Individual from Participation in Government Programs
As a civil sanction for their misconduct, those who defraud the government, for
example, by submitting false claims for services performed under a government
program, can be precluded from participating in government programs for a
specified period of time.3" Courts have held that such a sanction does not
constitute "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis, so that an
individual can be both excluded from participation in a government program and,
on the basis of the same conduct, punished in a separate criminal prosecution."
304. Id. (emphasis added).
305. Id. at 845 (emphasis added).
306. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989) (excluding individuals and entities from
participating in Medicare programs for a period of not less than five years).
307. Manocchio v. Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir. 1992) (upholding exclusion of a
doctor from participation in Medicare programs for not less than five years); United States v. Bizzell,
921 F.2d 263, 267 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding exclusion of two real estate dealers from participation in
HUD programs for 18 months and two years, respectively); Crawford v. Sullivan, No. 92C 3926, 1993
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In Manocchio v. Kusserow,"' for instance, the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) excluded a physician from participating in Medicare
programs for a period of not less than five years because he had been convicted of
submitting a fraudulent Medicare claim. The court rejected the doctor's contention
that the exclusion constituted an impermissible second punishment.3" It concluded
that while the exclusion "undoubtedly carries the 'sting of punishment,' the purpose
[the doctor's] exclusion serves is still remedial.""3 ' This result is correct, for as the
court explained:
The purpose of the exclusionary provision [in the Social Security Act]
"is to enable the [HHS] inspector general to keep [those who defraud
the programs] out of the Medicare and Medicaid Programs. They
deprive patients of needed services or supplies, and they divert taxpayer
funds from their intended purposes." Further, the mandatory
exclusionary period "strengthens the ability of the Secretary of [HHS]
to exclude from Medicare and Medicaid those health care providers and
practitioners who fail to provide quality health services or who have
engaged in fraud involving health care programs."3'11
WL 122294, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 1993) (upholding exclusion of doctor from participation in Medicare
programs for six years); Greene v. Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. 838, 840 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (upholding
exclusion of pharmacist from participation in Medicare programs for five years).
308. 961 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1992).
309. Id. at 1542.
310. Id.
311. Id. (citations omitted) (first bracketed material added); see also Greene, 731 F. Supp, at 840
("[The government] simply seeks to protect the Medicare and Medicaid programs by excluding a person
convicted of defrauding it. Its goals are clearly remedial and include protecting beneficiaries, maintaining
program integrity, fostering public confidence in the program, etc."). In United States v. Bizzell, 921
F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1990), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) filed
administrative complaints against two real estate dealers alleging numerous counts of supplying false
statements and violating other HUD regulations in the sale of five properties whose mortgages were
insured by HUD. HUD scught to suspend and debar the real estate dealers from participating in any
HUD programs for three years. The real estate dealers ultimately entered into settlement agreements with
HUD whereby one accepteA a voluntary exclusion from HUD programs for two years, conditioned upon
his payment to HUD of $30,000, and the other agreed not to participate in any HUD programs for
eighteen months. The govcrnment subsequently instituted a criminal prosecution against the real estate
dealers based upon essentially the same transactions and violations set forth in the HUD administrative
complaint leading to the settlement agreements. Rejecting the real estate dealers' claim that their
exclusion from participating in HUD programs constituted "punishment" for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause and that the criminal prosecution therefore was barred, the court concluded that "the
penalty of debarment is strictly remedial." Id. at 267. The court explained:
It is the clear intent of debarment to purge government programs of corrupt influences and
to prevent improper dissipation of public funds. Removal of persons whose participation
in those programs is detrimental to public purposes is remedial by definition. While those
persons may interpret debarment as punitive, and indeed feel as though they have been
punished, debarment constitutes the "rough remedial justice" permissible [under Halper]
as a prophylactic governmental action.
Id. (citation omitted).
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As with the revocation or lengthy suspension of an individual's license to engage
in a particular profession or business, even a sanction permanently (or for a lengthy
period of time) barring a person from participating in particular government
programs on the basis of a single, relatively minor transgression can be viewed as
serving primarily remedial purposes and therefore not constituting "punishment" for
double jeopardy purposes.
E. Sanctions Imposed Upon Inmates in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings
Halper has been held inapplicable to sanctions imposed upon inmates in prison
disciplinary proceedings, such as solitary confinement, adjustment segregation, the
forfeiture of good time, and the extension of a prisoner's mandatory release date."2
A number of courts reaching this result have held Halper inapplicable on the ground
that the double jeopardy provision merely "protects an individual from multiple
judicial punishments,"3 '3 and that therefore "[a]dministrative sanctions imposed by
prison officials upon a prisoner for crimes committed within the prison do not bar
subsequent prosecution for the crimes in a court of competent jurisdiction."3 '4
While it is true that Halper involved two judicial proceedings, one criminal and one
civil, there is no reason to believe the Supreme Court would have reached a
different result if the civil fine in that case had been imposed upon the defendant
in an administrative proceeding rather than a judicial one. As one court has stated,
"the fact that [a purely punitive sanction] was imposed in an administrative
proceeding, as opposed to a civil or criminal proceeding, does not change its nature.
A cow, after all, does not become a horse simply by calling it a horse."3"5
Nevertheless, these courts have not necessarily reached the wrong result. Courts
have stated that the primary purposes of sanctions imposed upon inmates in prison
disciplinary proceedings are the "maintenance of institutional order and safety and
[the] assistance of individual rehabilitation."316 Such purposes, of course, are
312. Matt v. State, 846 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); Quevedo v. State, 832 S.W.2d 422,
424 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); Smith v. State, 827 S.W.2d 71, 71-72 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); Prysock v. State,
817 S.W.2d 784,785 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Moore, 492 N.W.2d 190 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (text
in Westlaw); State v. Garrity, 486 N.W.2d 38 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (text in Westlaw); State
v. Fonder, 469 N.W.2d 922, 925-26 & n.4 (Wis. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 614 (1991).
313. Smith v. State, 827 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
314. Id. at 72; accord Quevedo, 832 S.W.2d at 424; Prysock, 817 S.W.2d at 785; State v. Garrity,
486 N.W.2d 38 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (text in Westlaw); see also In re Dandridge, 614 So.
2d 129, 130 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding expulsion of student by school board does not bar subsequent
delinquency proceeding based upon same conduct, because school board "administrative proceeding
resulting in expulsion does not constitute a criminal prosecution and trigger doublejeopardy protection.");
Fonder, 469 N.W.2d at 926 & n.4 (holding Halper "inapposite" because it "dealt with monetary damages
sought by the federal government pursuant to a statute aimed at providing reimbursement for the costs
of criminal prosecution," whereas this case deals with "administrative measures taken by a state agency
pursuant to state regulations aimed at maintaining prison order and rehabilitating prison inmates."), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 614 (1991).
315. Mullet v. Miller, 816 P.2d 251, 254 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245
(1992).
316. Fonder, 469 N.W.2d at 925; see also id. at 926 n.4 (stating prison disciplinary sanctions are
"aimed at maintaining prison order and rehabilitating prison inmates"); State v. Garrity, 486 N.W.2d 38
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remedial in nature. On the other hand, placing an inmate in solitary confinement,
taking away her good time, extending her mandatory release date, and other such
sanctions seem to also serve the purposes of punishment - retribution and
deterrence. That is, the sanctions appear to be aimed, at least in part, at punishing
the inmate for her misconduct and deterring both her and other inmates from
violating prison rules in the future. Indeed, it seems that the goal of maintaining
institutional order and safety is sought to be achieved, in part, by using the threat
of sanctions to deter inmates from engaging in misconduct. If sanctions imposed
upon prison inmates at least partially serve punitive purposes, the Double Jeopardy
Clause, as interpreted in Halper, should preclude the government from punishing
an inmate in a criminal proceeding after she already has been subject to disciplinary
action by prison officials on the basis of the same conduct.
Moreover, even if it is concluded that, in general, sanctions imposed "on inmates
in prison disciplinarf proceedings solely serve remedial purposes, a particular
sanction might at some point be so severe that it crosses the line between being
"remedial" and "punitive" in nature. For example, a term in solitary confinement
beyond a certain length may no longer be rationally related to the remedial purposes
a prison disciplinary sanction is intended to serve. Such a sanction therefore should
be deemed "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause? 7
(Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (text in Westlaw).
317. The extension of a prisoner's mandatory release date also might be considered punishment for
double jeopardy purposes. See Fonder, 469 N.W.2d at 929 (Sundby, J., concurring).
In addition to the sanctions discussed in the text, courts have found that a number of other
nonmonetary sanctions an- remedial, rather than punitive, in nature and therefore do not constitute
"punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. E.g., United States v. Woods, 949 F.2d 175, 177
(5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's declaring a savings and
loan association insolvent and placing it in receivership does not constitute "punishment" because "[bloth
the goal and the operation of the receivership have been to protect the United States treasury from
avoidable insurance losses by assuring proper management of the thrift according to the banking
regulations"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1562 (1992); United States v. Reed, 937 F.2d 575, 578 (11 th Cir.
1991) ("Where an individual and the government enter into an employment relationship governed by a
collective bargaining agreement, arbitration awards against the employee made pursuant to that agreement
can only serve as remed'es for breach of contract, and necessarily 'do no more than make the
Government whole.'"); Un'ted States v. Blocker, 33 M.J. 349, 351-52 (C.M.A. 1991) (holding that an
administrative board's reducing a serviceman's rank pending his discharge under other-than-honorable-
conditions for sexually assmulting several women - intended to ensure that the soldier "'does not enjoy
the status, authority or respect associated with military rank'" - does not constitute "punishment,"
because it helps "to ensure the readiness and competence of the force and the orderly separation of the
soldier," and it "could not in any sense be considered disproportionate to the damage which [the
serviceman's] sexual offenses did to the cohesiveness and morale of the military command and
community"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1214 (1992); In re Blodgett, 490 N.W.2d 638,647 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that a civil commitment for an indeterminate period, as a psychopathic personality, does
not constitute "punishment" because "[clommitment is not only for punitive purposes; persons committed
as psychopathic personalitis are entitled to treatment"), affd on other grounds, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn.
1994); Stuart v. Department of Social & Rehabilitation Serv., 846 P.2d 965, 969 (Mont. 1993) (holding
that Halper does not apply where department refused to pay dismissed employees their accrued vacation
benefits because their employment did not terminate for reasons not reflecting discredit upon themselves);
State v. Darby, 587 A.2d 1309, 1316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (holding that a bar against
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VIII. Determining the Amount of the Government's Loss
The Supreme Court in Halper concluded that the government is "entitled to rough
remedial justice' when seeking compensation for its damages and costs from a
wrongdoer who already has been punished criminally. As a general matter, the
government "may demand compensation [from such an individual] according to
somewhat imprecise formulas, such as reasonable liquidated damages or a fixed sum
plus double damages, without being deemed to have imposed a second punishment
for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis."319 However, where "one of those
imprecise formulas authorizes a supposedly remedial sanction that does not remotely
approximate the Government's damages and actual costs .... rough justice becomes
clear injustice,"3 and the penalty, although imposed in a civil proceeding, must
be deemed "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.3" The
Court in Halper stated:
What we announce now is a rule for the rare case.... where a fixed-
penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge offender to a
sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused.
The rule is one of reason: Where a defendant previously has sustained
a criminal penalty and the civil penalty sought in the subsequent
proceeding bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the
Government for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as "punishment"
in the plain meaning of the word, then the defendant is entitled to an
accounting of the Government's damages and costs to determine if the
penalty sought in fact constitutes a second punishment.'
On the basis of such accounting, the trial court must determine "the size of the
civil sanction the Government may receive without crossing the line between
remedy and punishment."" Although the Court in Halper recognized that "the
trial court's judgment in these matters often may amount to no more than an
approximation,"'3" it believed that "even an approximation will go far towards
ensuring both that the Government is fully compensated for [its damages and] costs
. . and that, as required by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the defendant is protected
securities-related activity, on account of securities fraud, is "clearly a remedial measure"); In re Young,
857 P.2d 989, 999-1000 (Wash. 1993) (holding that the civil commitment of a "sexually violent predator"
for an indefinite period after he has served his sentence does not constitute "punishment" because the
commitment does not serve any punitive goal, but rather is for the purposes of incapacitation and
treatment, both of which are "legitimate civil goals").
318. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446 (1989); see also id. at 449.
319. Id. at 446.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 448-49.
322. Id. at 449 (footnote omitted).
323. Id. at 450.
324. Id.
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from a sanction so disproportionate to the damages caused that it constitutes a
second punishment."3
The Supreme Court's opinion in Halper envisions a two-step approach to
determine whether a civil penalty intended to compensate the government for its
loss constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes?' First, it must be
determined whether the civil sanction is "overwhelmingly disproportionate" to the
damages and costs caused by the wrongdoer, and therefore does not bear a rational
relation to the goal of compensating the government for its loss."7 If it is not
"overwhelmingly disproportionate," then that sanction does not constitute
"punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis."z This is true even if the
325. Id.
326. See Rehg v. Illinoi; Dep't of Revenue, 605 N.E.2d 525,536 (111. 1992); see also United States
v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 36-37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
327. In some circumstances it may not be necessary to compare the amount of the civil sanction
with the amount of the government's loss. For example, in United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d
193 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 123 (1992), customs officials arrested the defendants and
assessed, large civil fines against them for possessing marijuana and attempting to import it into the
United States from Mexico. The defendants acknowledged the civil fines by executing promissory notes.
The government subsequently brought criminal charges against the defendants based upon the same
conduct for which they had been assessed the civil fines, and the defendants sought dismissal of the
criminal charges on the ground that the double jeopardy provision barred the prosecution because they
already had been "punished" for their conduct. Although the government conceded that under Halper
the civil fines, if paid, woutd constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes, id. at 195, the court
nonetheless rejected the defendants' claim. The court held that the defendants' "execution of promissory
notes, in the absence of a judgment or payment by [the defendants], does not constitute 'punishment'
under the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. at 201. The court reasoned:
The government has not yet attempted to take anything from the defendants, nor to
deprive them of thair liberty. Their property and liberty are as yet unmolested and free
from the exercise of sovereign power. [The defendants] are but presumed to be personally
obligated to the government, the holder thereof, unless and until they interpose a defense
sufficient to relieve them of the obligations.
... The purpos . served by having [the defendants] execute the promissory notes upon
their arrest and pursuant to a civil statute was but to obtain evidence of their indebtedness,
albeit prima facie, evidence. The notes did not constitute actual payment or actual
satisfaction whatsoever. The content of the promissory notes even anticipate the need for
future legal action to enforce their terms. Further, in the Notice of Penalty or Liquidated
Damages Incurred and Demand for Payment Document, the [defendants] were advised of
a possible procedure for side-stepping the payments of these assessments. ... How...
can it be said that the government's attempt to confirm evidence of debt in circumstances
where the government contemplates the possibility of further court action and where the
government advises the defendant of an available procedural mechanism for relief from
the notes is one which serves the goal of punishment?
... If the defendants actually pay the civil fines, then any subsequent criminal
prosecution world be double jeopardy.
Id. at 202-03 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Park, 947 F.2d 130, 134-35 (5th Cir. 1991)
(holding that $48,000 seized from defendant by customs officials when defendant failed to report he was
taking the money out of the country, and retained by them pending the outcome of defendant's criminal
trial, did not constitute "punishment," because defendant elected to delay civil forfeiture proceedings until
after the completion of his criminal trial), vacated in part on grant of reh'g on another issue, 951 F.2d
634 (5th Cir. 1992).
328. E.g., United States v. WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138, 142 (6th Cir. 1993) (civil penalty of $90,350
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tribunal that imposed the sanction did not in fact consider the amount of the
government's loss, for "[iln Halper, the Supreme Court specifically called for an
objective inquiry into what ends the fine reasonably may be said to serve."329 On
the other hand, if the civil sanction is "overwhelmingly disproportionate" to the
assessed for violations of safety standards under the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act "is not so extreme
and divorced from the United States' expenses incurred in the investigation and prosecution of the
defendants' violations to constitute punishment, rather than the remedial goal of ensuring safe mining
conditions and practices"); United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
$75,000 civil fine not so overwhelmingly disproportionate to the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission's costs of investigating and litigating the defendant's fraudulent activities that it must be
deemed punitive); United States v. J & T Coal, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 925, 928 (W.D. Va. 1993) (holding
that while civil penalties of about $300,000, assessed for violations of safety standards under the Federal
Mine Safety & Health Act, exceeded the $163,729 spent by the government in investigating the accident
in question and pursuing sanctions, they did not "reachi] the point, as in Halper, where they did not
'remotely approximate the Government's damages and actual costs, and [where] rough justice [became]
clear injustice."'); Martin v. Rutledge, 807 F. Supp. 693, 697 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (holding that $724,149.25
sought as restitution for defendant's breaches of fiduciary duty as trustee of pension plans does not
constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes because it is the amount the pension plans lost on
account of defendant's prohibited transactions); United States v. Fliegler, 756 F. Supp. 688, 697
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that government's costs of $110,564.90 incurred in prosecuting both the
criminal and civil actions against defendants "bears a rational relation to the $115,000 civil penalty"
imposed for 23 false claims submitted to the government by the sole shareholders and officers of a
defense contractor, and therefore does not constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes); United
States v. Marcus Schloss & Co., 724 F. Supp. 1123, 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that $19,650 penalty
in settlement of civil action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which represented
twice the amount of allegedly illegal profits obtained by the defendant through insider trading, does not
present "that 'rare case' where the fine paid is wholly divorced from the level of fraud and the
government's expenses, including those of investigation and prosecution," but "[r]ather... presents the
'ordinary case [where] fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages provisions can be said to do no more than
make the Government whole"); United States v. Pani, 717 F. Supp. 1013, 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding
that $32,460 civil penalty sought for presenting three false claims to the government, which represented
the statutory penalty of three times the damage the government sustained because of the defendant's acts
($1280) plus $10,000 for each false claim minus $1380 the defendant paid in restitution in a previous
criminal action based upon the same conduct, does not present "the 'rare case' of a 'prolific but small
gauge offender' subject to a second punishment 'overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has
caused'; rather, it bears a rational relationship to the goals of compensating the government for its loss,
considering the expenses of investigation and prosecution) (quoting Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1902); Mitchell
v. State, 818 P.2d 1163, 1164-65 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (holding that 50% penalty on the amount of
unemployment benefits defendant fraudulently obtained does not constitute "punishment" under Halper);
Purcell v. United States, 594 A.2d 527, 531 (D.C. 1991) (holding that "modest" fines paid for violating
civil traffic regulations are not "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes because they "bore a rational
relationship to the cost of enforcing the traffic regulations"); Merin v. Maglaki, 599 A.2d 1256, 1263-64
(N.J. 1992) (holding that maximum statutory penalty of $5000 for each of six false statements submitted
by defendant in support of a fraudulent claim for insurance benefits "is rationally related to the expenses
incurred by the government in the course of its investigation and prosecution of [defendant's] fraudulent
claim," and "any penalty imposed, up to t,4e maximum amount authorized by the statute, would not
constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes"); State v. Naydihor, 483 N.W.2d 253, 258-59 (Vis.
Ct. App. 1992) (holding that civil "forfeitures" of $67, $97, and $61 for traffic violations do not
"presento the 'rare case' described in Halper," because "[t]hese civil sanctions bear a rational relation to
the 'damage' to the state and are not so divorced from any remedial goal that they fairly can be said to
constitute 'punishment' in double jeopardy terms").
329. Furlett, 974 F.2d at 844; accord WRW Corp., 986 F.2d at 142.
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damages and costs resulting from the wrongdoer's conduct - as it was in Halper,
where the applicable statute authorized a penalty in excess of $130,000 for fraud in
the amount of $585 and investigative and prosecutorial expenses estimated by the
trial court at approximately $16,000'" - a rebuttable presumption arises that the
sanction is punitive in nature.' The government may attempt to rebut this
presumption by presenting an accounting of the actual costs and damages
attributable to the wrongdoer's conduct?32 Any portion of the civil sanction
exceeding this amount constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes.33
Because Halper requires that the amount of a civil sanction be compared with the
amount of the government's loss, it must be determined which factors can be
considered in comput ng the government's damages and costs. Clearly, any actual
loss suffered by the government because of the wrongdoer's conduct should be
included.3" For example, the trial court in Halper properly included the $585 that
the government overpaid the defendant's company as a result of the defendant's false
claims.
330. The Court in Halper characterized the situation in that case as one in which "the recovery [by
the government] is exponentially greater than the amount of the fraud, and, at least in the District Court's
informed view, is also many times the amount of the Government's total loss." United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435, 445 (1989).
331. Id. at 449, 452; 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 36; see, e.g., United States v. Hall, 730
F. Supp. 646, 654-55 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (stating that the absence of any quantification of actual losses
suffered by the government as a result of defendant's transporting bearer negotiable instruments in the
amount of $1,035,000 out of the country without filing the required monetary instrument report, when
coupled with the disproportionate relationship between the $1,035,000 civil fine and the damages
apparently caused by defendant's conduct, leads to the conclusion that the fine is "not rationally related
to the goal of making the Government whole"); Small v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 927, 928 (Va. Ct.
App. 1991) (en banc) (reversing the decision of the trial court for the reasons stated in the panel opinion
at 398 S.E.2d 98, 100 (Va. Ct. App. 1990)) (holding that a $3000 fine imposed in civil contempt
proceeding for violating an injunction barring defendant, a paving contractor, from engaging in certain
conduct bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the state for its loss, because the trial court
also awarded the state $16,999.50 to reimburse four of defendant's customers for damages they had
sustained, $2,425.50 in attorney's fees, and $136.50 in costs arising from the contempt action); see also
In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (9th Cir.) (holding that, in the absence of any evidence
regarding the actual damages and costs incurred by the government, drug tax of $208,105 imposed on
individuals following their convictions for possession and sale of dangerous drugs constitutes
"punishment" for double jec-pardy purposes), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993); Kvitka v. Board of
Registration in Medicine, 551 N.E.2d 915, 918-19 (Mass.) (holding that a $10,000 fine, imposed upon
a physician to penalize him and to deter other physicians from engaging in similar misconduct, and not
to reimburse the board for its expenses in handling the matter, constitutes "punishment" for double
jeopardy purposes), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 823 (1990).
332. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449, 452; 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d at 37; see, e.g., Hall, 730 F.
Supp. at 655 (refusing to grant summary judgment to defendant after concluding that the civil fine
assessed against him by the government constituted "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes, but,
instead, allowing the government an opportunity to present an accounting of its actual costs arising from
defendant's conduct and to r.'cover its demonstrated costs).
333. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
334. See id. at 444-45 (explaining why the sanction imposed in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,
317 U.S. 537 (1943), did not constitute "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis, the Court
stated that the government's injuries from the defendants' fraud included "the amount of the fraud itself').
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In addition to any actual loss suffered by the government, its injuries in a
particular case also include "ancillary costs,""33 such as the costs of detecting,
investigating, and prosecuting the defendant's conduct.336 This includes, for
example, direct personnel costs for the time spent on the matter by investigators and
attorneys,3. as well as supplies,33 travel expenses,339 office expenses,' 0 and
trial costs.4
As the Supreme Court recognized in Halper, however, "the precise amount of the
Government's damages and costs may prove to be difficult, if not impossible, to
ascertain.""MZ Therefore, "the process of affixing a sanction that compensates the
Government for all its costs inevitably involves an element of rough justice."' 3
For example, in Merin v. Maglaki,' the state filed a civil suit seeking the
statutorily authorized maximum penalty of $5000 for each of six false statements
submitted by the defendant in support of a fraudulent claim for insurance benefits.
In holding that the civil penalty sought by the government was "rationally related
to the expenses incurred by the government in the course of its investigation and
prosecution of [the defendant's] fraudulent claim," 5 the court stated:
We are not troubled by the fact that the State has not proven the
exact extent of its damages nor provided precise calculations to support
the penalties imposed. The [Insurance Fraud Prevention] Act established
a Division of Insurance Fraud Prevention within the Department of
Insurance. The Division assists the Commissioner [of Insurance] in
investigating allegations of insurance fraud and in developing and
implementing programs to prevent future frauds and abuse. The
Division has full-time supervisory and investigative personnel as well
as clerical and other staff to fulfill its responsibilities under the Act. All
the costs associated with those activities represent expenses related to
335. Id. at 445.
336. Id. at 445, 446 n.6.
337. State v. Darby, 587 A.2d 1309, 1316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (considering direct
personnel costs of $205,000 incurred by the government in a civil action against defendants for violations
of the state's securities law, almost three-fourths of which was for the estimated time spent on the matter
by two deputy attorneys-general, while the remaining quarter was for the estimated time spent on the
matter by employees of the Bureau of Securities); see also United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839, 844
(7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Fliegler, 756 F. Supp. 688, 692, 697 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Merin v.
Maglaki, 599 A.2d 1256, 1263-64 (N.J. 1992) (including supervisory personnel, clerical personnel, and
other staff at the Division of Insurance Fraud Prevention, which investigated the defendant's fraudulent
insurance claim).
338. State v. Darby, 587 A.2d 1309, 1316 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Fliegler, 756 F. Supp. at 692, 697 (including the costs of an expert witness); Darby, 587 A.2d
at 1316 (stating that physical plant costs also can be considered).
342. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989).
343. Id.
344. 599 A.2d 1256 (N.J. 1992).
345. Id. at 1263.
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investigating fraudulent claims, like that of [the defendant's] .... For
the State to provide precise calculations of the costs associated with
investigating and prosecuting a particular attempted insurance fraud
would be difficult, if not impossible. Yet, that the State incurs a
significant financial burden in uncovering and rectifying such activities
is undeniable. In such circumstances, penalties act, in effect, as
liquidated-damages clauses, with the purpose of avoiding the imposition
of unnecessarily wooden restrictions on the State's right to recover
damages.'
In a similar vein, the court in United States v. Walker 7 concluded that a $500
civil penalty assessed by customs inspectors against the defendant for his failure to
disclose that he was carrying approximately one gram of marijuana when he entered
the country on a commercial airplane" s bore "a rational relationship to the
government's costs." 9 Although the government did not produce specific evidence
of its expenses in the particular case, the court considered "the financial burden
associated with maintaining check points and administering the customs system" '
when computing the government's investigation and enforcement expenses. 5 '
346. Id. at 1263-64 (citations omitted). Similarly, in United States v. Valley Steel Prod. Co., 729
F. Supp. 1356 (Ct.Int'l Trade 1990), the court stated:
While it is obvious the Government sustained an assortment of damages as a result of the
defendants' conduct (of importing steel products into the country by submitting entry
documents with false and fraudulent statements and omissions], ascertaining the precise
nature and extent of the injuries suffered by the Government in a trade case like the one
before the Court, is a particularly difficult task. The defendants are not liable for
antidumping duties, but they could have been subjected to the duties had they not engaged
in the unlawful conduct with which they have been charged. In addition to absorbing the
cost of investigating and prosecuting the matter, the Government suffers diffuse harm
from trade, economic, and foreign policy repercussions due to defendants' conduct. "This
kind of damage, [is] not the less real for being difficult or impossible to measure." It is
the function of liquidated damages to provide recovery "when damages are uncertain in
nature or amount or are unmeasurable."
Id. at 1359-60 (footnote and citations omitted); see also United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839, 844 (7th
Cir. 1992) (stating that an affidavit submitted by the government in support of its opposition to
defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds could be relied upon even
though it did "not specify the exact costs of investigating [defendant's] activities, [but] instead provide[d]
only general approximations of the hours spent investigating the entire fraudulent scheme of [defendant]
and [his codefendants]").
347. 940 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1991).
348. Although the relevant statute imposed a $5000 civil penalty on first offenders, a Customs
Directive automatically "mitigated" that penalty to $500. Id. at 443.
349. Id. at 444.
350. Id.
351. The 'court was unplrsuaded by the defendant's argument that the $500 penalty did not bear a
rational relation to the government's loss because it took less than an hour for him to clear customs and
involved only one government employee. Id.
In United States v. 40 Mcon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41 (Ist Cir. 1989), where the government obtained
the forfeiture of an entire 17.9 acre tract of land (including a house and other structures thereon) that the
claimant used in the cultivation of marijuana, the court stated:
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Care must be taken, however, when apportioning the government's general
enforcement costs to a particular defendant. As the court stated in United States v.
38 Whalers Cove Drive:3
The assessment of costs and damages must be individualized. A
reasonable allocation of the more generalized enforcement costs - in
the nature of overhead - may also be allowed. The allocation must not
be incommensurate with the portion of the overall enforcement problem
represented by the offense at hand. While we are extremely sympathetic
to the need to address our nation's serious narcotics problems, we do not
believe that a disproportionately large [sanction] can be reasonably
justified as a civil fine as opposed to punishment by placing full
responsibility for the "war on drugs" on the shoulders of every
individual [defendant]. This is particularly so where the individual
[defendant's] violations are relatively minor?'
Even for an infraction of the narcotics laws far smaller in magnitude than that of
[claimants], forfeiture of the entire tract of land upon which the drugs were produced or
possessed with intent to distribute is justifiable as a means of remedying the government's
injury and loss. The ravages of drugs upon our nation and the billions the government is
being forced to spend upon investigation and enforcement - not to mention the costs of
drug-related crime and drug abuse treatment, rehabilitation, and prevention - easily
justify a recovery in excess of the strict value of the property actually devoted to growing
the illegal substance, in this case marijuana.
Id. at 44 (alternative holding).
352. 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
353. Id. at 37 (citations omitted); accord In re Forfeiture of 1986 Pontiac Firebird, 600 So. 2d 1178,
1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Alvarez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also United
States v. Walker, 940 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1991), discussed in supra text accompanying notes 328-32,
where the dissenting judge pointed out that the approach taken by the majority in that case could justify
unlimited civil fines being imposed upon a defendant. He stated:
The government maintains that the amount [of the civil penalty] is trivial in light of the
expense required to maintain a system of customs inspection. No doubt it is. But why
should a pro rata share of the customs inspection system be a measure? There would be
no customs inspection system without the Department of the Treasury. Should not a pro
rata share of Treasury expense be the measure? There would be no Treasury without the
government as a whole. Should not a pro rata share of the expense of the government as
a whole be the measure? These questions suggest how a pro rata share of the actual
expense of setting up the structure which led to [the defendant's] detection could lead to
the justification of astronomical fines. An amount of $500 is trivial in relation to a pro
rata share of the expense of the Treasury or the government; so are $5000 or $50,000 or
$500,000. In short, pro rata share of the expense gives the government an essentially
arbitrary choice as to the system whose expense is shared and a virtual blank check as to
the amount it can assess. Such unlimited discretion to determine the amount that may be
imposed points to the punitive rather than the compensatory character of the fine assessed.
Id. at 444 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
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IX. Conclusion
In United States v. Halper,3' the Supreme Court extended the protection the
Double Jeopardy Clause affords by holding that a sanction imposed in a civil
proceeding brought by the government can, under certain circumstances, constitute
"punishment" for double jeopardy purposes." That decision, however, involved
a monetary penalty imposed in a civil proceeding brought after the defendant
already had been prosecuted and punished criminally for the Same conduct.
Therefore, Halper gives rise to a number of questions concerning the scope of this
new protection. This article has tried to answer four of those questions. Specifical-
ly, it has concluded that although a civil sanction can constitute "punishment" for
double jeopardy purposes even when imposed before a criminal prosecution for the
same conduct, the Doable Jeopardy Clause does not bar the subsequent criminal
prosecution. Also, a tax imposed upon the unlawful possession of marijuana and
other controlled substances constitutes "punishment" for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Although a nonmonetary civil penalty typically will not constitute
"punishment" for double jeopardy purposes, there may be circumstances under
which it will. Finally, this article has shown how the government's loss should be
determined in cases in which the purpose of the civil sanction is to compensate the
government for its damages and costs.
354. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
355. Id. at 448.
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